

GRID 2026







A woman is walking away from the camera along a dirt path that runs alongside a large body of water. She is carrying a large white sack on her head and a yellow container in her right hand. The path is made of reddish-brown earth, and the water is a calm, blue-grey color. The sky is clear and blue.

Global Report on Internal Displacement

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Internal displacements by conflict and disasters in 2025



The country, territory names and figures are shown only when the total internal displacements value exceeds 100,000. Due to rounding, some totals may not correspond with the sum of the separate figures.

The boundaries, names shown and designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IDMC.

With thanks

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Cover Image: A woman walking along a narrow road in Unity, State, South Sudan, where escalating conflict, violence and seasonal floods are forcing communities to move repeatedly. The increase in countries reporting both conflict and disaster displacement underscores the complexity of internal displacement and the need to strengthen resilience in fragile and conflict-affected countries. © Rian Cope/AFP via Getty Images



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Key definitions and metrics

Defining internal displacement

Internal displacement refers to the forced movement of people within the country in which they live.

Internally displaced people (IDPs) are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border (UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998).

Measuring internal displacement

The number of internally displaced people (IDPs) is a snapshot of the total number of people living in internal displacement at a specific point in time in a specific location. For this report, such a snapshot is made as of the end of each year. This number includes people uprooted within a year who have not been able to return home or find another solution to displacement, plus people who have been displaced in previous years and have not found a lasting solution.

An internal displacement refers to each new forced movement of a person within the borders of the country of their habitual residence recorded during the year. The same person or people can be displaced several times over a given period before finding a solution to their displacement. Figures include each time a person is forced to move as an internal displacement. This figure illustrates dynamics of displacement in a specific crisis.

Due to rounding, some totals may not correspond with the sum of the separate figures.

Borders and regions

Country and territory boundaries and the names shown and the designations used on maps do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IDMC.

More information

For more detailed explanations of the data for specific countries, please refer to the figure analysis at www.internal-displacement.org/countries/




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Flooding in Hanoi, Viet Nam, following a tropical cyclone. Across East Asia and the Pacific, storms triggered around 14.8 million movements, the highest regional figure in a decade. © UNICEF/UNI876282/Do Khuong Duy

Foreword



Displaced children play at a former school in Kassala State, Sudan. The country hosted the largest IDP population in the world for a third consecutive year. © UNOCHA/Giles Clarke

This Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID) is published at a moment of profound contradiction.

Internal displacement is more visible in global policy discussions than ever before, yet it still fails to mobilise the urgency and sustained action it requires. In a context of competing crises – each vying for attention, resources and political will – millions of internally displaced people continue to be pushed to the margins. This report offers a stark reminder of that reality.

In 2025, renewed and increasingly internationalised conflicts drove displacement across all regions. In many places, violence escalated at a speed and scale that left civilians with little warning and few real choices. Homes, hospitals and schools – objects protected under international humanitarian law – came under attack, forcing families to flee, often repeatedly, in search of safety.

In my work, I have witnessed an alarming rise in arbitrary displacement being used deliberately as a weapon of war. Siege tactics, evacuation orders issued without safeguards, the use of drones and explosive weapons in populated areas, and attacks on camps for internally displaced people and on humanitarian workers are no longer isolated incidents. These are not unfortunate by-products of conflict, but violations

of international law with devastating and long-term consequences for individuals, communities and prospects for peace.

As IDMC notes, the decline in reported internal displacement in 2025 does not always reflect progress towards durable solutions. In many cases, it reflects temporary or unsafe returns, data constraints, reduced disaster displacement, or improved preparedness. Falling numbers of internally displaced people must not lead to reduced political, financial or moral responsibility. Millions remain displaced for years or decades, often with limited access to services, protection and livelihoods. For women and girls in particular, displacement continues to heighten the risk of violence and exploitation.

Reliable, timely and disaggregated data is essential to break this cycle. It not only makes displacement visible, but also strengthens accountability and informs more effective policy and operational responses. It enables governments and partners to anticipate risks, target support, and align humanitarian, development and peacebuilding efforts. Crucially, it also creates space for the meaningful participation of internally displaced people in decisions that affect their lives.

Internal displacement is not solely a humanitarian concern. It is also a devel-

opment, peacebuilding and climate challenge that reflects deeper structural issues, including weak governance, inequality and exclusion. Addressing it requires sustained national leadership, stronger international cooperation, and a multilateral system that is fit for purpose.

Above all, internally displaced people must be at the centre of the response. Their perspectives, capacities and rights must shape policies and solutions – not as an afterthought, but as a foundation for durable solutions.

If the findings of this report do not compel greater urgency, we must ask what will. When displacement becomes normalised, injustice risks becoming entrenched.

Paula Gaviria Betancur
UN Special Rapporteur on
the human rights of Internally
displaced persons (IDPs)

Message from the Director



Residents travel by boat along a flooded street following Cyclone Ditwah in Western Province, Sri Lanka. With 560,000 internal displacements, the cyclone triggered the country's highest disaster displacement figure since 2016.
© UNICEF/UNI908442/UNICEF

This edition of the annual Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID) highlights a significant shift. For the first time, conflict and violence triggered more movements during the year than disasters.

By the end of 2025, more than 82 million people remained internally displaced – a slight decrease from 2024, but still close to record high levels.

As I assume my position as Director of IDMC, I am acutely aware of the importance of maintaining a spotlight on internally displaced people. Behind the figures are disrupted and often devastated lives – the stories of children, adults, families, and communities. Some may return to relative normality, though most will never be the same again.

Every experience of displacement is unique. At IDMC we translate these individual stories into globally comparable data. This is necessary to ensure internal displacement remains visible and relevant in policy discussions, to enable informed decision-making.

Rising conflict, growing instability and a changing climate are the defining characteristics of our times. Internal displacement is a clear indication that systems are under strain and failing to protect people.

Reliable data, targeted policies and long-term investments are vital for governments to prevent displacement, help displaced people rebuild their lives, and strengthen societies for the future. Ensuring the sustainability of displacement data systems is therefore a technical priority and a strategic imperative.

As this report highlights, those systems are under pressure, as funding cuts have constrained data collection. In a context of reduced resources and growing needs, more states must lead and institutionalise displacement data systems, which humanitarian actors and civil society are critical in complementing. We must all address data fragmentation and generate robust evidence.

In this new environment, IDMC is committed to driving coherence across the displacement data landscape. Through closer collaboration with partners, we aim to make systems more efficient and maximise the impact of data. Our focus is on aligning global, national and local efforts to close data gaps, build more resilient data systems and provide analysis that supports more informed policies and action.

Displacement is not inevitable. It is the result of unaddressed risks, unresolved crises and underlying vulnerabilities. At

IDMC, through reliable evidence, we remain resolved to ensure that the risk of future displacement is reduced and the lives of internally displaced people are improved.

Tracy Lucas
Director of the Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre

Executive summary

The number of internally displaced people slightly decreases

More than 82.2 million people were living in internal displacement across 104 countries and territories at the end of 2025. More than 68.6 million were displaced by conflict and violence, and almost 13.6 million by disasters. This is the first decrease in a decade, but the global figures remain high.

The decline was largely the result of returns in parts of Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Syria (see DRC spotlight, p. 23). Returns do not necessarily equate to durable solutions, however, and long-term monitoring is essential to ensure displacement-related vulnerabilities are overcome, particularly in areas where insecurity persists.

In some settings, the decrease may also reflect reduced data availability or shifts in sources, as observed in 15 per cent of countries in 2025. Nearly three-quarters of countries and territories hosting people internally displaced by conflict and violence did not have up-to-date data as of the end of the year. This underscores the importance of sustained investment in robust and diversified data systems to support

accurate monitoring and informed policymaking (see Building sustainable data systems, p. 9).

IDMC recorded more than 62.2 million movements across 146 countries and territories in 2025. This is a drop of six per cent compared with 2024, but it masks diverging dynamics. Displacements triggered by conflict and violence rose by nearly 60 per cent to reach a record 32.3 million, while disaster displacements fell by 35 per cent to 29.9 million after the exceptional levels recorded in 2024.

Conflict and violence led to more displacements than disasters for the first time, but 42 countries recorded movements linked to both triggers, highlighting the recurrent overlap between conflict and disaster risks. This underscores the importance of integrating displacement into disaster risk reduction, climate adaptation and peacebuilding efforts, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected countries.

Conflict displacements reach a record high

Conflict and violence triggered 32.3 million new or repeated movements across 48 countries and territories in 2025. This was a 60 per cent increase compared with 2024, more than double

the decadal average and the highest figure on record. Displacement was highly concentrated, with Iran and DRC each accounting for around a third of the global total, which illustrates how a small number of crises can shape global trends.

International armed conflicts accounted for 46 per cent of the total. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine and hostilities involving Palestine, Lebanon and Israel, the number of countries recording displacement linked to international conflicts rose from six in 2024 to 13. All regions except the Americas were affected, with border tensions re-erupting between Cambodia and Thailand, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and India and Pakistan.

These developments highlight the need for sustained, comprehensive and coordinated peacebuilding efforts that address the underlying causes of conflict and facilitate durable solutions for those displaced.

Civilians continued to bear the brunt of conflict and violence, particularly in densely populated urban areas, where attacks triggered rapid, large-scale and often repeated movements in 2025. Fighting in and around cities such as El Fasher, Goma and Tehran contributed significantly to global displacement figures.

When conflict and violence reach urban hubs, the destruction of infrastructure and disruption of public services reverberates nationwide, disrupting markets, transport, governance, communications, education and healthcare. It also impedes emergency responses, reconstruction and long-term economic development.

Urban areas often function as places of refuge as well, hosting large numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs) seeking safety and livelihood opportunities. When conflict and violence reach these areas, displacement sites can become targets, forcing IDPs to move again, as was the case in Sudan's Zamzam camp and the Gaza Strip (see spotlight, p. 31).

Disaster displacements decline

Disaster displacements declined in 2025 to 29.9 million new or repeated movements across 140 countries and territories. This was a 35 per cent decrease from the exceptionally high levels recorded in 2024 but still 13 per cent higher than the decadal average.

Storms triggered 17.9 million movements, about 60 per cent of the total and the second highest annual figure on record for this hazard. There were fewer cyclones in 2025, but a small number of high-intensity events triggered significant displacement, with particularly negative impacts on countries such as Jamaica, Sri Lanka and Viet Nam.

Flood displacements, in contrast, declined significantly to fewer than 7.9 million, 31 per cent down on the decadal average. Reductions in several flood-prone areas in east and south Asia as well as west and east Africa contributed to the overall decrease in disaster movements.

Wildfires led to displacement in new and existing hotspots, triggering more than 694,000 movements, the second highest figure in a decade. Major events occurred in previous hotspots such as the United States' Los Angeles county,

Greece's Attica region and Türkiye's İzmir province, while the Republic of Korea recorded its highest ever figure (see spotlight, p. 69). These events illustrate how extreme weather conditions are stretching even advanced response systems in areas accustomed to wildfires, while becoming a growing threat.

Geophysical hazards triggered around 2.5 million displacements, also the second highest figure in a decade. Tsunami alerts in Chile and Japan prompted nearly 1.6 million pre-emptive evacuations after Russia's far east was struck by one of the most powerful earthquakes on record (see spotlight, p. 51), while an earthquake in Istanbul triggered around 100,000 movements.

No large-scale destruction and long-term displacement were recorded in any of the three cases, but earthquakes in populated areas of Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Myanmar caused extensive damage and, in some instances, affected people already exposed to conflict.

Preparedness played a significant role in shaping these displacement outcomes. Impacts varied significantly depending on early warning systems, evacuation protocols and response capacity, as well as geological factors.

When supported by effective monitoring, coordinated response and community preparedness, temporary displacement through evacuation can function as a protective measure that reduces human and economic losses.

Internal displacement remains a defining global challenge as its main triggers, conflict, violence and disasters, continue to intensify. Resolving the phenomenon goes beyond humanitarian assistance. It requires sustained efforts to prevent displacement, resolve conflicts and support durable solutions for the many millions of IDPs across the world. Strengthening monitoring, data and evidence are essential to inform these efforts and ensure that policies and investments match the scale of the challenge.

The global picture



*Two girls stand in their home damaged by earthquakes in Herat Province in 2022, Afghanistan. Years of conflict and disasters have left nearly seven million people living in internal displacement as of the end of 2025.
© UNHCR/Oxygen Empire Media Production*

Internally displaced people (IDPs) at the end of 2025


82.2m



What is the total number of IDPs?


The total number of IDPs is a snapshot of all the people living in internal displacement at the end of the year. Due to rounding, some totals may not correspond with the sum of the separate figures. (see p. V for further information)

Displaced by conflict and violence



The boundaries, names and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IDMC.

Displaced by disasters



The boundaries, names and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IDMC.

68.6 million

Internally displaced people as a result of conflict and violence in 54 countries and territories as of 31 December 2025

↓ 7%

Decrease in the number of people internally displaced by conflict and violence compared with 2024


13.6 million

Internally displaced people as a result of disasters in 82 countries and territories as of 31 December 2025

↑ 37%

Increase in the number of people internally displaced by disasters compared with 2024

The number of IDPs declines for the first time in a decade



The number of people living in displacement fell for the first time since 2016, but remained near record level and far above the decadal average.

Total number of IDPs in millions
*First year disaster data is available

Why do the trends in the number of IDPs and movements differ?

The number of IDPs reflects a snapshot at a specific point in time, while movements count how many times people are displaced over a specific period. The number of IDPs includes people displaced for years, even if they were not displaced during the past year. Movements are monitored throughout the year and count each displacement, including repeated movements by the same person. Some of these movements may be temporary or pre-emptive, meaning not all people remain displaced by the end of the year.

What is needed to reduce the number of IDPs?

Humanitarian aid alone will not suffice to reduce the scale of displacement. To help IDPs put a sustainable end to their situation, governments need to set up policies and take actions that resolve conflicts and build peace, reduce poverty and disaster risk, and enable people to return, resettle, or locally integrate in host communities. Data on displacement and solutions will continue to be key to inform such policies and actions moving forward.

Internal displacements in 2025

Conflict and violence


32.3m

52%
of internal displacements were caused by conflict and violence


What are internal displacements?

The internal displacements figure refers to the number of forced movements of people within the borders of their country recorded during the year. This helps capture repeated and multiple movements. (see p. V for further information)

Ten countries reporting the highest figures



Breakdown by type of conflict or violence



46%
of the displacements were triggered by international armed conflict.

41%
of movements recorded were triggered by non-international armed conflict.

Due to rounding, some totals may not correspond with the sum of the separate figures.


Key displacement situations

1/3
of global conflict displacements took place in Iran, all linked to temporary evacuations from Tehran.

1/3
of global conflict displacements took place in DRC, the country's highest on record.

8%
more movements by conflict and violence than by disasters – the first time on record.

Conflict displacement reaches record high



The number of displacements by conflict and violence increased by nearly **60%** compared with 2024.

Internal displacements in 2025

Disasters


29.9m

48%
of internal displacements
were caused by
disasters


What are internal displacements?

The internal displacements figure refers to the number of forced movements of people within the borders of their country recorded during the year. This helps capture repeated and multiple movements. (see p. V for further information)

Ten countries reporting the highest figures



Breakdown by hazard



60%
of disaster displacements
were triggered by storms

60%
decrease in flood displacements
compared to 2024

*Includes wet mass movements and extreme temperatures
**Includes volcanic activity and dry mass movements
Due to rounding, some totals may not correspond with the sum of the separate figures.


Key displacement situations

36%
of global disaster
displacements were
in the Philippines.

1/3
of global disaster
displacements took
place in November.

2.4 million
pre-emptive evacuations were
reported, mostly in Chile and
Cuba, a significant underestimate.

Disaster displacements drop significantly



Fewer large-scale
floods led to a
35%
drop in the number of
movements compared
with 2024.

Building resilient and sustainable displacement data systems

Changes in displacement data availability in 2025

Reliable data is essential for understanding the scale and impacts of internal displacement. Governments cannot prevent, respond to or resolve displacement without knowing how many people are displaced, where they are and whether progress toward durable solutions is being achieved. When displacement data systems weaken, displacement risks becoming less visible in national, regional and global policy discussions.

Displacement data systems experienced noticeable disruption in 2025. IDMC observed reductions in displacement data availability in 15 per cent of the countries and territories it monitored, three times the share affected in 2024. This was the result of fewer assessment rounds, less geographical coverage and the loss of previously available data sources.

Long-standing structural gaps in displacement data systems, combined with recent reductions in funding for humanitarian data collection contributed to the disruption. Nineteen of the 26 countries where the International Organization for Migration's Displacement Tracking Matrix (IOM-DTM) conducted assessments in 2024, for example, experienced a decline in the number of data collection rounds in 2025. Among these, 11 had no assessments conducted at all.

Reductions in data availability can weaken the reliability of estimates of how many people are displaced and how many times during a given year, and the number of people still living in displacement at the end of it. Without robust and up-to-date data, IDPs risk becoming invisible, observed displacement trends may not reflect reality, and policymaking may rely on incomplete information.

Outdated assessments and lost data sources for IDP estimates

Estimating the number of IDPs at a specific point in time requires regular verification exercises and updated assessments. Without them, estimates can quickly become outdated, particularly in settings affected by active conflict and violence.


The availability of updated information on people living in displacement as a result of conflict and violence at the end of 2025 varied significantly across countries and regions. Some of the largest displacement situations, including Sudan, Colombia, Syria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), continued to produce reliable and up-to-date information.

Elsewhere, however, data gaps were widespread. Seventy-three per cent of the countries and territories IDMC monitored had incomplete or outdated data. In around half of the countries moni-



Internally displaced people gather in a village in Nampula, northern Mozambique. Escalating conflict and violence in late 2025 triggered 235,000 movements, likely making the last IDP assessment from March an underestimate. © UNHCR/Isadora Zoni

Timeliness of data on people displaced by conflict and violence



the number of IDPs at the end of year based on earlier assessments is likely to underestimate the end-of-year situation and level of need.

Elsewhere the loss of previously available data sources affected estimates. In the Philippines, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) had consistently assessed the number of people living in displacement in Mindanao as a result of violence that erupted in 2017, and the government reported regularly on newly displaced people due to new clashes in the country. No updated information was available in 2025 on people previously displaced, however, meaning this population may be overlooked.

In fact, no assessments were conducted during the year in one in five of the countries IDMC monitored. The most recent assessments in Ethiopia and Afghanistan, for example, were in August 2024

tored, assessments were conducted at some point during 2025 but were not up to date at the end of the year. In Mozambique, for example, the most recent comprehensive assessment was conducted in March. Conflict and violence erupted again between September and November, however, triggering more than 235,000 movements. This means that any estimate of

the number of IDPs at the end of year based on earlier assessments is likely to underestimate the end-of-year situation and level of need.

and July 2023 respectively, despite both countries experiencing renewed and rapidly evolving insecurity and displacement.

These examples illustrate how outdated assessments, the loss of data sources or the interruption of their coverage affect the accuracy of estimates of the number of IDPs at a given point in time and can misrepresent displacement trends.

Reduced frequency and coverage of movements

Estimates of movements depend on frequent and geographically comprehensive assessments conducted throughout the year to record displacement events as they occur. When assessments become less frequent or cover fewer locations, information gaps may appear or get larger and movements may be underestimated.

Assessments in 11 per cent of the countries and territories IDMC monitored in 2025 were less frequent or covered fewer areas than in the previous year.

Despite criminal violence continuing to trigger record displacement in Haiti, for example, budget constraints forced IOM-DTM to conduct only three assessment rounds compared with four in 2024. It is likely that some displacement events or repeated movements were not captured as a result.

Nigeria's first nationwide disaster displacement assessment was conducted in 2024 after years of coordination between the country's national and state emergency management agencies and IOM. No joint national assessments were carried out in 2025, however, impeding the consistent capture of disaster displacement across the country.

There was also a shift in sources that reported movements in 2025. UN agencies accounted for 27 per cent of such sources globally between 2020 and 2024, but that figure dropped to 18 per cent in 2025.

Towards resilient and sustainable data systems

The changes in the availability of displacement data highlight the importance of resilient systems that can continue to generate information when operational conditions change.

In many countries, displacement assessments depend on a combination of government data systems and humanitarian and civil society input, particularly in fragile or constrained settings. Such arrangements provide more consistent and comprehensive information on displacement.


Governments hold the primary responsibility for collecting such data, and national systems play a central and guiding role. In East Asia and the Pacific, government agencies tend to be the primary source of information on disaster displacement and there was minimal disruption in 2025.

Indonesia's National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB), for example, has a data collection and reporting system supported by regular updates and coordination across national and subnational levels. This enables the production of timely and geographically detailed information on displacement, including for small-scale and recurrent disasters.

Government systems may not always be able to collect timely and comprehensive displacement information, however, particularly in remote or hard-to-reach areas, or where the production of data relies on periodic surveys rather than continuous registration systems. Non-state organisations can complement national efforts in such settings.

The Colombian government, for example, maintains a comprehensive legal and institutional framework to assess and register people displaced by conflict and violence, and more recently disasters. Humanitarian organisations such as UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) play

Countries and territories with reduced displacement data availability



The boundaries, names and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IDMC.

a supplementary role by collecting data in areas where it is present and where insecurity limits state access.

Civil society initiatives can also support the development of national data systems. Displacement data initially collected by the NGO 3iS in Ecuador in 2024 informed a household survey conducted by the country's Ombudsman's Office in collaboration with UNHCR in provinces most affected by violence in 2025.

Maintaining global visibility and comparability

Keeping internal displacement on global, regional and national agendas requires an independent, credible and comparable reference point. IDMC aggregates, verifies and harmonises information from a wide range of sources to produce nationally comprehensive and internationally comparable estimates of the scale of the phenomenon. In doing so it provides a global baseline that allows trends to be tracked consistently across countries and over time, even when national data systems differ in scope, methodology or frequency.

IDMC's estimates relied on a single primary data source in only a third of the countries it monitored between 2016 and 2024, which were then systematically validated and triangulated. In the remaining two-thirds, estimates were based on a number of independent sources, which addressed temporal and geographical gaps in data collection. This multi-source approach strengthened the robustness and comparability of estimates across diverse settings.

This approach became particularly important in 2025 as reductions in assessment frequency and coverage created significant data gaps. To address them, IDMC reviewed more than 4,500 documents from 630 sources, including contextual and supplementary information such as media reports, and consulted with in-country partners involved in displacement monitoring worldwide.

In countries such as Ethiopia and Afghanistan, where no new assessments were conducted, it worked with in-country partners to validate and maintain estimates. In Nigeria, it combined IOM-DTM assessments with data from National Emergency Management Agency to fill gaps in geographical coverage.

These examples highlight how triangulation and partner validation help to address data gaps and maintain continuity in displacement monitoring.

The quality and comprehensiveness of global displacement estimates ultimately depend on the information generated by national and humanitarian data systems. By identifying where information is limited, outdated or unevenly available, IDMC helps to strengthen such systems and identify areas for investment. At the same time, it continues to explore the use of proxies, particularly in settings where data collection has been reduced or discontinued.

Through these efforts, IDMC helps ensure that internal displacement remains visible in national, regional and global policy discussions, supports greater data transparency and comparability, and contributes to a stronger evidence base to inform policies and interventions.


Regional overviews



A boy stands in front of his destroyed home in Mykolaiv oblast, Ukraine. The war, continued displacement and a lack of safe schools have left many displaced children without access to education.

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Sub-Saharan Africa



Sub-Saharan Africa recorded **17.3 million** internal displacements in 2025, triggered primarily by persistent conflict and violence. This was a decrease on the 2024 figure, largely the result of a significant reduction in disaster displacement.

Conflict and violence triggered **14.5 million** movements, 83 per cent of the overall regional figure. This was nearly 45 per cent of the global total for conflict displacement. It was also the highest figure on record for the region, mainly fuelled by the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).


Disasters accounted for **2.9 million** movements, a nearly three-fold decrease on the 2024 figure, reflecting a global reduction in the number of flood displacements.

Around **31.7 million people** were living in internal displacement across the region as of the end of the year, a slight decrease compared with 2024, mostly the result of returns in DRC and Sudan, but still accounting for almost 39 per cent of the global total.




A displaced woman sits on a bed in a former school in Kassala State, Sudan. Despite the first reported returns since the start of the war, 9.1 million people remained internally displaced as of the end of 2025. © UNOCHA/Giles Clarke

First drop in the number of IDPs in at least a decade



Total number of IDPs in Sub-Saharan Africa in millions
*First year disaster data is available

Record conflict displacement while number of disaster movements falls



Internal displacements in Sub-Saharan Africa in millions

Conflict and violence

DRC accounted for 67 per cent of the 14.5 million displacements triggered by conflict and violence in sub-Saharan Africa in 2025. It recorded 9.7 million movements, by far its highest figure on record and accounted for almost a third of all conflict displacements globally. Significant advances by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) triggered large waves of movements in North and South Kivu in January, February and December (see spotlight, p. 23).

The number of displacements in Sudan fell for the second year in a row, but South Sudan recorded its highest figure in more than a decade. Recurring conflict and violence in Nigeria, Ethiopia and Mozambique triggered additional conflict displacements.

Around 29 million people across the region were living in displacement as a result of conflict and violence at the end of the year. Sudan, DRC and Nigeria

continued to host the largest numbers of IDPs as continued insecurity impeded progress towards durable solutions. The region accounted for 42 per cent of the global total.


Civilian toll continues in Sudan while insecurity increases in South Sudan

Sudan recorded more than 1.7 million displacements, a significant decrease compared with the previous two years following a reduction in large-scale fighting in the eastern states of Khartoum and Al Jazirah. Targeted violence against civilians, including IDPs, continued, however, particularly in North Darfur, where more than 713,000 movements were recorded.¹

Sub-Saharan Africa recorded 14.5 million conflict displacements, 42 per cent of the global total.

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) destroyed the Zamzam displacement camp in April after a year-long siege,

Number of IDPs drops for the first time in a decade after millions of returns



triggering almost 500,000 onward movements.² The group also took the North Darfuri capital of El Fasher, the last city in the wider Darfur region outside its control, in late October, leading to at least 127,000 displacements.

Around 9.1 million people were living in displacement in Sudan at the end of the year, 62 per cent of them in Darfur.³ Despite a 2.4 million decrease on 2024, the country still hosted the highest number of IDPs in the world for the third year in a row, reflecting the cumulative effects of prolonged conflict. The first returns since the start of the war in April 2023 mainly took place towards urban centres in Al Jazirah and Khartoum states, where heavy fighting had taken place early in the conflict.⁴

The frontlines of the war extended south towards the Kordofan states, which border Unity and Upper Nile states in **South Sudan**, at the end of year.⁵ Inter-communal disputes over land and other resources in South Sudan were aggravated by the proliferation of weapons, the fragmentation of NSAGs, a disrupted economy and challenges regarding the implementation of the 2018 Peace Agreement. The arrival of more than 256,000 people fleeing from abroad, particularly Sudan, and living in internal displacement in the country also increased pressures.⁶

South Sudan recorded nearly 864,000 internal displacements, its highest figure in more than a decade.

The country recorded nearly 864,000 displacements, a more than three-fold increase on 2024 and its highest figure since 2014, when the civil war broke out. In contrast with 2024, when communal violence dominated displacement patterns, non-international armed conflict accounted for 61 per cent of the total, more than 533,000 movements.

Conflict was concentrated in Western Equatoria, Warrap, Jonglei and Upper Nile in January, April and November.⁷ Seasonal flooding overlapped with insecurity, as it had done in previous years.⁸

Recurring violence in Ethiopia and Mozambique

Ethiopia recorded nearly 353,000 displacements, its lowest figure since 2016 and continuing a downward trend since 2021.⁹ The figure is an approximate estimate, however, because data collection constraints meant small-scale and short-term movements may not have been captured (see p. 9).

More than 40 per cent of the movements took place in July when communal violence erupted in the south of the country.¹⁰ The border area between the Oromia and Somali regions had been relatively calm since 2018, highlighting the recurring and shifting nature of violence and displacement.¹¹ It remains unclear how many of those displaced in July were still displaced at the end of the year.

Conflict in recent years had been concentrated in parts of Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz and Kamashi, as well as in the Tigray region, where more than 761,000 people were still living in displacement, and the Amhara region, which hosted 165,000 IDPs.¹² These figures were however not updated in 2025.

After a significant reduction in conflict displacement in **Mozambique's** northern province of Cabo Delgado between June 2024 and June 2025, fighting between NSAGs and the armed forces broke out again in the second half of the year. A third of the 339,000 displacements recorded in the country in 2025, the highest figure since 2020, took place in November alone.¹³

Three countries recording the highest internal displacements by conflict and violence

Dem. Rep. Congo
9.7m

Sudan
1.7m

South Sudan
864,000

Others



Data gaps in West Africa

The number of displacements triggered by conflict and violence in West Africa continued to decline from its 2023 peak, but data gaps and access constraints hindered understanding of the impact of the region's persistent insecurity (see p. 9).

Nigeria continued to account for most movements with 354,000, a conservative figure given limited geographical coverage. Criminal violence, mostly in the north-western states of Katsina, Sokoto and Zamfara, accounted for nearly 40 per cent of the total. The same states also recorded increased displacement linked to NSAGs from the Central Sahel.¹⁴ Communal violence also escalated in the Middle Belt state of Benue, triggering nearly 59,000 movements.¹⁵

The dynamics and location of conflict and violence in Nigeria have shifted significantly in recent years, but the north-eastern state of Borno still accounted for nearly half of the country's 3.5 million IDPs at the end of 2025, underscoring the protracted nature of displacement in the northeast.¹⁶

Data gaps and access constraints limited insights into internal displacement trends in West Africa.

Burkina Faso recorded a comparable 316,000 movements despite its much smaller population. The figure was less than half of its peak in 2023, but large parts of the northern, central and eastern regions continued to experience insecurity and the figure should be considered an underestimate. Reduced reporting, small-scale and short-term pendular movements and blockades of villages may have contributed to the decrease.¹⁷

Nearly 2.1 million people were living in displacement due to conflict and violence as of March 2023, the last available data. The government has



A displaced woman collects water lilies in a flooded field near Bentiu displacement camp, South Sudan. Overlapping conflict, violence and disasters have left 1.6 million people living in internal displacement as of the end of 2025.

© UNICEF/UNI896489/Nelson

embarked on a digital registration project to better record people still living in displacement and returns.¹⁸

Niger recorded 166,000 displacements, a 66 per cent increase compared with 100,000 in 2024 and the country's second highest figure on record. Insecurity increased and expanded geographically in border areas, particularly Dosso, while coverage and reporting capacity improved in the Zinder and Maradi regions, contributing to better detection of displacement events.¹⁹ The country hosted an estimated 392,000 IDPs by the end of the year, an underestimate given limited geographical and temporal data coverage.

Humanitarian access constraints increased in **Mali** just as insecurity triggered 95,000 movements, down 27 per cent on the figure for 2024. Most were recorded in Tombouctou region, but limited data collection and validation, in part linked to funding cuts, impeded a comprehensive understanding of the evolving situation. The overall displacement figure should be considered an underestimate as a result.²⁰ Nearly 409,000 people were still displaced by conflict and violence by the end of the year, an underestimate which excludes regions inaccessible due to insecurity.

Chad recorded an even more pronounced drop of 46 per cent to 36,000 movements. Access limitations and limited reporting capacity meant the majority were recorded in Lac province and neighbouring Hajer Lamis where violence has expanded.

Around 593,000 people were living in displacement across the country at the end of the year. Returnees from Sudan accounted for at least 60 per cent of the total, illustrating another consequence of the country's war on the wider region.²¹

Disasters

Disasters triggered nearly 2.9 million displacements in sub-Saharan Africa in 2025. The near three-fold decrease compared with 2024 was largely the result of fewer flood displacements, a trend also observed globally. Floods still accounted for half of the total while consecutive cyclones in south-eastern Africa triggered nearly a third.

After years of significant drought displacement in the Horn and southern Africa, fewer such movements were recorded in 2025, but that was partly the result of reduced reporting. Earthquakes and wildfires, by contrast, triggered some of the highest numbers of displacements on record for such hazards in the region. The increase in wildfire displacements, which is part of a global trend, highlights the diversification of disaster risk in the region as well as improved monitoring (see spotlight, p. 69).


More than 2.7 million people across sub-Saharan Africa were living in displacement as result of disasters at the end of the year, with Ethiopia, South Sudan and DRC each accounting for around a quarter of the total. All three countries also experienced escalating conflict and violence during the year, underscoring the overlapping nature of displacement triggers.

Disasters overlap with conflict

South Sudan recorded most flood displacements in sub-Saharan Africa in 2025 with more than 487,000, over a third of the regional total.²² They were concentrated in Jonglei, Unity and Western Equatoria states, which were also heavily affected by conflict and violence.²³ The figure was lower than for the 2024 and the 2019 to 2022 flood seasons, but their cumulative impacts on livelihoods, agriculture and aid access left little respite for those affected.²⁴

DRC recorded more than 280,000 movements linked with floods, less

Flood displacements decrease significantly



than 40 per cent of the 2024 figure. A third took place in November during the rainy season. More than 106,000 were recorded in Kinshasa, reflecting high exposure in densely populated urban areas. It was the most significant flood displacement in the capital since 2022.²⁵ Around 67,000 flood-related movements were recorded in North and South Kivu, which also accounted for the bulk of conflict displacement in 2025 (see spotlight, p. 23).

Ethiopia, South Sudan and DRC each accounted for around a quarter of IDPs displaced by disasters, underscoring the overlap of conflict and disaster displacement.

Floods triggered nearly half of **Ethiopia's** 244,000 disaster displacements.²⁶ Most took place between August and November in the regions of Afar, Gambela, Oromia and Somali. The country also recorded 78,000 displacements in early January when a series of earthquakes struck. The number of movements exceeded all those associated with earthquakes in sub-Saharan Africa since 2008. The quakes affected areas along the border between Afar and Oromia regions, which also experienced floods, conflict and violence during the year. The quakes also increased the risk of nearby volcanic activity, underscoring the country's exposure to various hazards.²⁷

Consecutive cyclones in southern Africa

Southern Africa's east coast is exposed to cyclones every year between October and March, often leading to repeated displacement. The 2024-2025 season illustrated this pattern. High-intensity cyclones in quick succession triggered 826,000 movements in 2025, the second highest figure in a decade.

Cyclone Dikeledi triggered 167,000 displacements in **Mozambique's** northern Nampula province in early January and 20,000 in Mayotte only a few weeks after cyclone Chido had led to more than 536,000 and 142,000 displacements, respectively. Cyclone Jude followed in March, triggering 493,000 movements in Mozambique, affecting many of the same populations.²⁸ The repeated shocks underlined the country's exposure to various hazards as it recovered from the lingering impacts of drought in 2024.²⁹

Three countries recording the highest internal displacements by disaster

Mozambique
669,000

South Sudan
489,000

Somalia
335,000

Others



Spotlight – Democratic Republic of the Congo

Conflict and violence trigger a record high of nearly 10 million movements

2025 marked a turning point in the complex crisis in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Over 9.7 million conflict displacements were recorded during the year, nearly twice as many as 2024 which was already a record high. The rapid military takeover of major cities by the March 23 movement (M23) at the start and end of the year forced millions of people to flee and triggered nearly five million displacements.

Nearly 2.3 million occurred in January and February and over two million more in October and December.³⁰ The forced return of hundreds of thousands of people displaced for years led to a 31 per cent decrease in the number of people living in displacement as result of conflict and violence, which stood at 4.3 million as of the end of 2025.³¹

After six months of ceasefire, large-scale attacks in North Kivu province escalated rapidly in the two first months of the year. M23 captured Masisi and Sake territories within weeks and took control of the provincial capital Goma and its peripheral territory of Nyiragongo, which together were hosting more than 714,000 IDPs at the end of 2024.

Unlike its brief 2012 takeover, M23's latest offensive was broader and more sustained. Almost 45 per cent of the annual displacements took place in North Kivu, but South Kivu accounted for 36 per cent of movements. By mid-February, M23 had taken South Kivu's Kalehe and Uvira territories, capturing the provincial capital of Bukavu.³² The fall in March of Idjwi island, long considered a demilitarised safe zone for those fleeing violence, illustrated the unprecedented scope of the group's operations and the dwindling number of safe spaces for IDPs.³³

The number of displacements reduced slightly as M23 became the de-facto authorities but remained high. Violence in July and October, mostly in North Kivu, led to more than a million displacements each month, and a new wave of attacks in South Kivu triggered half a million movements in a few days in early December.³⁴

The fighting disrupted agricultural production, supply routes, markets and humanitarian deliveries, making food a top need among IDPs.³⁵ The destruction of healthcare and water infrastructure and overcrowding in host families contributed to a cholera outbreak that surpassed that of 2024.³⁶

The capture of the two provincial capitals disrupted humanitarian operations, many of which were run out of Goma. Aid facilities, hospitals and schools were looted, damaged or destroyed and airports and banks seized, severely hampering activities and access to people in need.³⁷ These constraints were compounded by funding shortages, including a significant drop in US funding, which had previously accounted for around 70 per cent of the DRC response.³⁸

Forced returns

The change in authorities led to a significant shift in displacement patterns. M23 dismantled or destroyed the majority of displacement sites, which led to a drop of more than 97 per cent in the number of IDPs in Goma and Nyiragongo.³⁹ There were slightly more than 1.2 million people living in displacement across North Kivu at the end of 2025, compared with 2.4 million a year earlier. The unexpected return of large numbers of people, particularly in Masisi and Lubero territories overwhelmed fragile infrastructure and services.⁴⁰

Unexploded ordnance posed new risks to IDPs and returnees, and the proliferation of weapons, the presence of NSAGs and the erosion of the rule of law left many exposed to renewed violence and forced recruitment.⁴¹


Initial assessments in Masisi, Rutshuru and Kalehe territories indicated that many returnees struggled to access their homes because they had been destroyed or occupied, or their tenure documents lost during displacement.⁴² Land and property disputes accounted for many of recorded incidents of violence in North Kivu in 2025.⁴³ NSAGs' control of land and roads also hampered returnees' access to their fields, disrupting agricultural livelihoods, self-sufficiency and prospects for durable solutions.⁴⁴

Community solidarity and the role of local and religious leaders are a vital source of resilience in the face of such challenges, particularly where long-term government or international support is limited. While communities have hosted tens of thousands of returnees across eastern DRC, a survey in Minova and Mweso territories found that two-thirds of respondents described social cohesion between IDPs, returnees and host communities as good, an essential enabling condition for durable solutions either through return, local integration or resettlement.⁴⁵

The apparent decline in number of people living in displacement as a result of conflict and violence in DRC from 6.2 million to 4.3 million in 2025 should not be mistaken for progress.⁴⁶ Behind the figure lie hundreds of thousands of forced returns, destroyed infrastructure and deepening social and environmental pressures.⁴⁷

4.3 million

IDPs by conflict and violence as of the end of 2025



Source: Data compiled by IDMC

Behind the data

Improved disaggregated data

Since the resurgence of M23 in November 2021, IDMC has made significant progress in refining the disaggregation of available data to provide a more granular picture of displacement dynamics and support the response. These improvements are built on data from operational partners such as the International Organization for Migration's Displacement Tracking Matrix (IOM-DTM) and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), which have long collected granular information.

From primarily nationwide annual figures compiled from a range of sources before 2022 to timely province-level reporting, IDMC has been offering a clearer view of where and how conflict displacement has evolved. Further refinements since 2024 have allowed a distinction to be made between displacements triggered by different NSAGs. It also improved the visibility of smaller, often overlooked crises in


provinces such as Ituri and South Kivu and enabled event-based analysis.⁴⁸

Significant data gaps remain, however, particularly in remote and insecure areas. Reports from the US Agency for International Development and Intersos with the UN Refugee Agency, were halted in 2025. IDMC relied instead on data from IOM-DTM, OCHA's reports, EHTools and media sources. Some nationwide IOM-DTM assessments of the number of people living in displacement were also interrupted, meaning the number of IDPs at the end of the year is the best available estimate rather than a comprehensive figure.

Collaboration with local and international partners will be essential to further expand coverage and ensure accurate and consistent data as the basis for planning humanitarian and peacebuilding activities.

A young man leaves a dismantled displacement camp in North Kivu Province, Democratic Republic of the Congo, carrying his belongings to seek shelter. The non-state armed group M23 dismantled or destroyed most displacement sites in North Kivu, forcing displaced people to return. © UNICEF/UNI751821/Benekire

Middle East and North Africa



The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) recorded **13.7 million** internal displacements in 2025, its highest annual figure on record. The region accounted for more than 40 per cent of all conflict displacements globally, underscoring its central role in shaping global trends.

Conflict and violence triggered **13.4 million movements**, more than 2.6 times the 2024 figure, which was already the highest on record. The sharp increase was the result of expanding international armed conflict across the region.


Disasters accounted for around **294,000 displacements**, less than half the 2024 figure. Most were recorded in Yemen, where floods overlapped with conflict and further constrained humanitarian access. Systematic data collection challenges continued to impede a detailed understanding of disaster displacement in the region.

Nearly **14.2 million people** were living in internal displacement across MENA at the end of 2025, 15 per cent fewer than the previous year. The reduction was partly the result of reported returns in Syria and Lebanon.




A market in Aleppo, Syria, surrounded by damaged and destroyed buildings. Amid the political transition, continued insecurity presents challenges as internally displaced people seek to re-establish their lives. ©Tareq Mnadili/NRC

Number of IDPs declines across the region



Total number of IDPs in the Middle East and North Africa in millions
*First year disaster data is available

Conflict displacements surge to new high



Internal displacements in the Middle East and North Africa in millions

Conflict and violence

Conflict and violence triggered 13.4 million displacements in MENA in 2025, by far the region's highest figure on record. Long-running conflicts continued to fuel repeated displacement, but it was the expansion of international armed conflict into populated areas that led to a second consecutive increase.

Around three-quarters of the movements were associated with the evacuation of large parts of Iran's capital, Tehran. The rest were linked to persistent violence and hostilities, particularly in Palestine and Syria (see spotlight, p. 31).

Nearly 14 million people in MENA were living in displacement as a result of conflict and violence at the end of the year. Syria accounted for nearly 43 per cent of the total, Yemen for more than a third and Palestine almost 15 per cent, together amounting to around a fifth of the global total.


Displacements from international armed conflict increase

Israel conducted military operations in **Iran** between 13 and 24 June, triggering around ten million movements. It accounted for almost a third of the annual global total and marked the largest single conflict displacement event in such a short period of time that IDMC has ever recorded. It was the first time conflict displacement had been recorded in Iran. This also significantly increased displacements associated with international armed conflict globally.⁴⁹

With 13.4 million movements, the region recorded its highest annual figure, accounting for around 40 per cent of global conflict displacements.

Evacuation orders from the Israeli military and warnings from the United States led most of Tehran's population to flee, mostly to provinces along the Caspian Sea.⁵⁰ Around six million people sheltered in Mazandaran and four million in Gilan.⁵¹

Number of IDPs drops after large-scale returns



Syria's transition reshapes displacement patterns

The lack of dedicated shelters in the capital meant mosques and metro stations became places of refuge for those who remained.⁵² A telecommunications black-out made estimates difficult to confirm, but all those who fled were assumed to have returned after the 12-day war.

Counterstrikes by Iran triggered around 9,000 displacements in **Israel**. Those affected sheltered in hotels or with friends and family. This figure does not account for people sheltering in private or public bunkers.⁵³

Long-running conflicts continued to fuel repeated displacement, while the expansion of international armed conflict into populated areas drove the significant increase.

Persistent hostilities in **Palestine** triggered nearly 2.8 million displacements. The number of movements in the Gaza Strip fell from 3.2 million in 2024 to 2.7 million, but despite ceasefires, return was still impossible for more than two million IDPs. The number of displacements in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, increased more than five-fold as Israeli military operations intensified in refugee camps. Settler violence also escalated and housing demolition continued to lead to displacement. The freedom of movement of Palestinians was also restricted by greater physical and administrative obstacles (see spotlight, p. 31).⁵⁴

In **Lebanon**, more than 41,000 displacements were recorded as a result of Israeli military operations mostly at the southern border, despite the November 2024 ceasefire. This figure is highly conservative given that funding constraints significantly reduced monitoring and reporting in the country. The number of people living in displacement at the end of 2025 reduced from 985,000 to 64,000 as the ceasefire still allowed for a reduction in conflict and violence and some returns.⁵⁵

Syria underwent a political transition in 2025 after the fall of Bashar al-Assad's government in December 2024. The number of IDPs fell from 7.4 million in 2024 to six million at the end of 2025 as people returned in an attempt to rebuild their lives.⁵⁶

Nearly two million IDPs were living in rural Damascus by the end of the year, more than double the 2024 figure and a third of the national total for 2025. The number of IDPs in Idlib governorate fell from nearly 2.2 million to 945,000.⁵⁷

Barriers to sustainable return and reintegration remain significant across Syria, including extensive housing destruction, lack of basic infrastructure, such as water and electricity, and legal documentation challenges, including for housing, land and property. IDPs' achievement of durable solutions will require long-term funding and support for rebuilding. Child-sensitive approaches to recovery and long-term solutions are also needed, given that more than half of the country's IDPs are children.⁵⁸

Despite large-scale fighting subsiding, localised insecurity continued to disrupt stability and undermine prospects for durable solutions. More than 531,000 displacements were recorded, compared with 768,000 in 2024.⁵⁹

The largest movements took place in as-Suweida governorate in July and August, when fighting triggered 184,000.⁶⁰ Fighting in Latakia and Tartus governorates also led to around 51,000 displacements in March.⁶¹ Displacements were also reported in January and December in parts of Aleppo governorate.⁶²

Three countries recording the highest internal displacements by conflict and violence

Iran
10m

Palestine
2.8m

Syria
531,000
Others

Disasters

Disasters triggered around 294,000 displacements in MENA in 2025, half the figure for 2024. It was one of the lowest regional totals globally, in part reflecting persistent challenges in reporting and monitoring disaster displacement in settings also affected by conflict.

Yemen accounted for around 90 per cent of the movements, triggered primarily by floods and storms that often overlapped with protracted conflict. Iraq recorded 16,000 drought displacements, around a third the 2024 figure, in part the result of less reporting.

More than 207,000 people in MENA were living in displacement as result of disasters at the end of the year, a conservative figure given the challenges in distinguishing between conflict and environmental shocks. Iraq accounted for around 186,000 IDPs as a result of drought.


Floods overlap with conflict

Yemen recorded 264,000 disaster displacements as erratic weather patterns brought both severe floods and prolonged dry spells. Floods led to the majority of the movements, reaching their second highest figure on record. Almost a quarter of them took place in the north-western Hajjah governorate and almost a fifth in the south-western Aden governorate.

Floods and storms in Yemen drove around 90 per cent of the region's disaster movements.

Flooding was particularly intense in August, destroying some IDPs' shelters, triggering repeated displacement and increasing exposure to health risks and unexploded ordnance. They also reduced crop yields while funding cuts limited food aid, which left more than half of the population in acute food insecurity.⁶³

Floods are the main displacement trigger



Floods accounted for more movements than conflict for the third consecutive year, although the two phenomena often overlapped. Nearly 57,000 conflict displacements were recorded, a 56 per cent increase on 2024.⁶⁴ These included nearly 29,000 displacements linked to conflict in the Hajjah governorate.⁶⁵

Significant political and security shifts in December led to fighting and nearly 8,600 displacements in the southern governorate of Hadhramaut, which had not previously been a conflict hotspot.⁶⁶

Around 4.8 million people in Yemen were living in displacement as a result of conflict and disasters at the end of the year, the seventh highest figure globally. Insecurity and lack of economic opportunities are the main barriers to IDPs' return or local integration.⁶⁷

Floods in the Gaza Strip devastated communities already displaced by conflict.

Floods in **Palestine** wreaked havoc on communities already displaced by conflict in the Gaza Strip. Aid supplies had improved somewhat with the start of a ceasefire in October, but heavy rains in November and December led to widespread flooding. The floodwaters contaminated IDPs' tents with sewage and led to at least 69,000 displacements in November.

The onset of winter increased the need for suitable shelter and clothes while water shortages, lack of healthcare provision, deteriorating sanitary conditions and overcrowding led to an increase in cases of preventable diseases, particularly among vulnerable groups such as children, the elderly, those chronically ill and women (see spotlight, p. 31).⁶⁸

Three countries recording the highest internal displacements by disaster

Yemen
264,000

Iraq
16,000

Israel
7,000

Others



Spotlight – Palestine

Escalating violence and protracted displacement

Conflict and violence triggered around 2.8 million displacements in Palestine in 2025, leaving two million people internally displaced at the end of the year. The number of movements recorded in the Gaza Strip fell by almost 16 per cent, from 3.2 million in 2024 to 2.7 million. In the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, displacements increased more than five-fold to 51,000, the highest figure on record since 1967.⁶⁹ Without significant efforts to restore access to homes and services, support voluntary and safe returns and allow for reconstruction and recovery, displacement is likely to become increasingly protracted.

Gaza Strip

A ceasefire agreement took effect in the Gaza Strip on 19 January, leading to a decline in hostilities and the temporary withdrawal of Israeli forces.⁷⁰ This allowed 642,000 people to move mostly to the northern governorates, including Gaza City, in the first weeks.⁷¹ Most returned to severely damaged or destroyed homes and limited services.⁷² Conditions for sustainable return were non-existent, meaning many of the movements were pendular.⁷³

A ban on humanitarian aid in early March left the territory under complete siege again, increasing the population's needs.⁷⁴ Hostilities resumed on 18 March, including airstrikes, new relocation directives and expanded ground operations.⁷⁵ With nearly the entire population having already been displaced, more than 80 per cent of Gaza fell under a relocation directive or inside the militarised “buffer zone” by mid-May, leaving no reliably safe locations for civilians.⁷⁶

After international alerts about starvation, restricted aid deliveries resumed

in mid-May, but were insufficient.⁷⁷ Famine was announced in Gaza governorate in August and the entire population of the strip was classified as experiencing acute food insecurity, including 641,000 people facing IPC phase 5, or “catastrophe” conditions.⁷⁸ Daily displacements peaked on 10 October at nearly 182,000, just as another ceasefire came into effect. From then until the end of the year, nearly 815,000 movements were recorded, nearly a third of the annual total.

Of the two million people living in displacement by the end of the year, 1.3 million were in need of emergency shelter. A newly established “yellow line” demarcating a restricted-access zone prevented Palestinians from accessing more than half of the territory.⁷⁹ More than 80 per cent of Gaza's infrastructure had been damaged or destroyed by the beginning of the October ceasefire, and unexploded ordnance posed a significant risk.⁸⁰

Infrastructure collapse and restricted humanitarian access impeded life-saving assistance, and basic services were all but absent. A lack of capacity to remove rubble and scarce building materials made reconstruction and recovery very challenging.⁸¹

West Bank

The 19 January ceasefire temporarily reduced hostilities in Gaza, but large-scale Israeli air and ground operations in the West Bank started on 21 January, targeting the Jenin, Tulkarm and Nur Shams refugee camps. More than 33,000 Palestine refugees, the entire population of the camps, were forced to flee, the largest displacement figure recorded for the West Bank.⁸² Satellite

imagery suggests the January military operations caused significant housing destruction, but this was not included in estimates because access restrictions prevented verification of its extent.⁸³

The attacks resulted in a ten-fold increase in displacements associated with military operations compared with 2024. El Far'a camp was also targeted, but the 4,000 people displaced were able to return. Israeli authorities prevented returns to other camps and restricted the delivery of aid, pushing the number of people living in displacement in the West Bank at the end of the year to more than 9,000, a figure which excludes displaced refugees.⁸⁴

Settler violence triggered nearly 1,700 movements, nearly triple the figure for 2024. Nearly three-quarters took place in Ramallah, Bethlehem and Nablus governorates.⁸⁵ The largest displacement event took place in Nablus on 8 October before the Gaza ceasefire was announced.⁸⁶ The average number of daily attacks on Palestinians by armed settlers was at its highest on record in 2025. Incidents have become more frequent, severe and organised over the past two years.⁸⁷

The demolition of housing based on the discriminatory denial of Israeli-issued building permits or punitive grounds triggered more than 2,100 displacements. Bedouin and herding communities continued to be particularly vulnerable to these practices.⁸⁸

Housing, land and property challenges are increasingly significant because obtaining land title registration is nearly impossible for Palestinians under Israeli settlement processes. These obstacles further heighten the risk of prolonged and recurrent displacement.⁸⁹

2.8 million

internal displacements



Behind the data

Protracted displacement

IDPs are at risk of protracted displacement if obstacles to durable solutions exist. Even after active hostilities have stopped, bringing displacement to a sustainable end can take years.


Durable solutions, as defined by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) framework, take the form of voluntary and dignified return, local integration or resettlement. For solutions to be sustainable, a number of criteria need to be met, including IDPs' access without discrimination to adequate housing, land, essential services, security and livelihood opportunities. It is essential that governments report consistently and continuously on IDPs to avoid them falling off the agenda and ensure they receive the support they need.⁹⁰

IDMC relies on structured data from government sources and organisations on the ground to assess whether people remain displaced. When this information is unavailable, IDMC may use other sources and proxies, such as destroyed housing, to estimate how many people are still living in displacement at the end of a given year, which may lead to under or over-estimates.

IDMC also relies on contextual analysis and inputs from partners to validate whether people remain displaced. In the absence of these as well as up-to-date data, whether actual or proxy, IDMC generally assumes that people displaced by conflict and violence have achieved some form of durable solution within a year of the last reliable update.

People travel along a road surrounded by rubble in the Gaza Strip, Palestine, as families begin returning to their homes following the ceasefire. Around two million people were living in internal displacement as of the end of 2025, including 1.3 million in need of emergency shelter. © UNOCHA/Charlotte Cans

South Asia



South Asia recorded nearly **5.2 million** internal displacements in 2025, more than half of the 2024 figure, as a mild monsoon season meant there were fewer cyclones and floods, mostly concentrated in the second half of the year.


Disasters still triggered more than **4.6 million** movements, however, nearly two-thirds of which were linked to a single flood event in Pakistan. The number of displacements associated with conflict and violence increased nearly 49-fold to **548,000**, primarily the result of escalating fighting in Pakistan's border areas. This was the region's highest figure since the 2021 Taliban takeover of Afghanistan.

Around **14 million people** were internally displaced across the region at the end of the year, nearly 17 per cent of the global total. Half of them were in Afghanistan, while almost 40 per cent were in Bangladesh, both as a result of years-old conflicts and disasters.




A man inspects a damaged house following airstrikes in Kandahar province, Afghanistan, in October. Conflict displacements in South Asia in 2025 increased nearly 50-fold compared with the previous year, largely driven by international armed conflict. © SANAUULLAH SEIAM/AFP via Getty Images

People displaced by disasters drive sharp increase in total



Total number of IDPs in South Asia in millions
*First year disaster data is available

The number of disaster displacements reduces by half



Internal displacements in South Asia in millions
*in thousands

Disasters

South Asia recorded over 4.6 million disaster displacements in 2025, around 16 per cent of the global total. This was a significant drop compared with recent years, partly the result of fewer tropical cyclones and the fact they tended to affect less densely populated areas. Displacement patterns also shifted, with Pakistan accounting for nearly two-thirds of the movements, followed by India and Sri Lanka.

Floods remained the main trigger, accounting for 78 per cent of the movements, but one cyclone also caused widespread disruption, primarily in Sri Lanka. Other hazards, including earthquakes in Afghanistan and river-bank erosion in India, led to localised displacement.

Nearly 8.3 million people were living in internal displacement in the region as of the end of 2025. Improved data collection through a country wide assessment of Bangladesh's protracted situations revealed an estimated 5 million people

were internally displaced due to disasters, some of them for years, highlighting the importance of historical data revision and the challenges of long-term displacement (see Behind the data, p. 42).⁹¹ An additional 2.6 million were in Afghanistan.


Major floods in Pakistan trigger displacement

Floods triggered 3.6 million displacements across South Asia, a significant drop from the six million recorded in 2024, reflecting fewer large-scale, high-impact flood events worldwide in 2025.

Fewer cyclones contributed to a significant drop in disaster displacements across the region.

Pakistan accounted for 84 per cent of the movements, with over 2.8 million recorded in Punjab province at the end of July. Nearly 375,000 people were still displaced by the floods at the end of the year. By comparison, the devastating June to September 2022 floods

Floods and storms trigger fewer displacements than in 2024



triggered 7.2 million movements in neighbouring Sindh province, which recorded 184,000 movements in 2025. These recurring events underline the highly localised and seasonal nature of floods and the country's exposure and vulnerability to such events.⁹²

Fewer large-scale, high-impact floods drove a significant drop in flood displacements across Pakistan, India and Bangladesh.

The number of flood displacements fell even more significantly elsewhere in the region. **India** recorded nearly 472,000, compared with a decadal average of 3.5 million. The state of Uttar Pradesh was the most affected, accounting for more than a quarter of the total.⁹³ The remaining three-quarters were associated with smaller-scale floods across the country, mostly during the monsoon season between June and September.

Bangladesh recorded a similar decline, with fewer than 94,000 movements in 2025, down from 1.3 million in 2024 and a five-fold decrease from its decadal average. Nearly 89 per cent took place in the eastern part of the country in late August, mostly in Chattogram division, which registers some of the highest displacement figures every year given its exposure on the Bay of Bengal coast and its population's high vulnerability, particularly in Cox's Bazar.⁹⁴

Late cyclone devastates parts of Sri Lanka

At least one high-intensity tropical cyclone a year tends to strike South Asia. They often hit exposed and densely populated areas of coastal India and Bangladesh in May or June and trigger a large share of the region's disaster displacements. Only two large but lesser cyclones struck in 2025, much later in the year and in different locations. Cyclone Montha on 25 October and Ditwah on 28 November accounted for all of the year's storm displacements.

Ditwah triggered at least 560,000 movements in **Sri Lanka**, a far more significant impact than in neighbouring India despite the island's much smaller size and population. This was nearly triple the country's average disaster displacement of the last decade and its highest figure since 2016. It was also Sri Lanka's deadliest disaster since the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Prolonged and intense rainfall rather than high windspeeds caused most of the damage, triggering widespread flooding and landslides that affected all of the country's 25 districts. Kandy and Nuwara in Central province recorded more than a third of the movements. Humanitarian access to remote areas was hampered by landslides.⁹⁵

The country has been struggling with an economic crisis for years and early assessments of Ditwah's impacts suggest it will set back development gains and require long-term recovery efforts. The storm left around 178,000 people living in displacement in more than 1,400 government facilities as of the end of the year.⁹⁶

Montha triggered around 116,000 evacuations in **India's** south-eastern state of Andhra Pradesh, and Ditwah triggered around 2,400 movements across the country. Taken together they accounted for the country's lowest annual storm displacement figure on record and a ten-fold decrease compared with 2024, when cyclones Remal and Dana hit.⁹⁷

Afghanistan earthquakes

A 6.0 magnitude earthquake struck **Afghanistan** on 31 August, killing nearly 2,000 people and destroying nearly 6,800 homes in the eastern provinces of Nangahar and Laghman.⁹⁸ A second 6.2 magnitude earthquake then struck near the northern city of Mazar el-Sharif in early November. Both earthquakes led to fewer than 8,200 displacements as many people already living in precarious or temporary living arrangements did not move again, reflecting the lack of safe alternatives.⁹⁹

Three countries recording the highest internal displacements by disaster

Pakistan
3m

India
672,000

Sri Lanka
564,000

Others

The figures were significantly lower than the 378,000 movements triggered by the 2023 Herat earthquakes and the 118,000 recorded after the 2022 Khost-Paktika quakes, but IDPs faced similar challenges.¹⁰⁰

In Afghanistan, many people returned to their places of origin despite limited livelihood opportunities, inadequate access to basic services and weak infrastructure.

Many people living in displacement in Afghanistan have been affected by decades of conflict, recurrent drought and a prolonged economic crisis that has left few resources for aid and recovery. Many people have returned from within and outside the country to places of origin with limited livelihood opportunities and inadequate access to basic services and infrastructure.¹⁰¹

Slow-onset disasters

Erosion has increasingly been linked to displacement in South Asia, reflecting improved monitoring of slow-onset hazards (see Behind the data, p. 60). In **India**, around 80,000 movements were recorded in Malda district in West Bengal, where the rapidly eroding banks of the Ganga, Fulhar and Kosi rivers threatened dozens of settlements.¹⁰²

Bangladesh recorded more than 9,400 displacements in the northern districts of Krigram, Lalmonirhat and Rangpur as rivers overflowed and eroded surrounding land. Thousands more remain exposed, facing risks to their homes and livelihoods in the absence of strengthened embankments and mitigation measures.¹⁰³

These examples show how slow-onset disasters, although less evident than flash floods or earthquakes, can also trigger displacement and have potentially devastating long-term impacts on communities and livelihoods. The nature of the above events meant that none of the IDPs were able to return and all were still living in displacement at the end of the year.



A woman walks through a flooded road in Western province, Sri Lanka, after Cyclone Ditwah in November. The cyclone triggered around 560,000 movements and was the country's deadliest disaster in over a decade.
© UNICEF/UNI908441/UNICEF Sri Lanka

Conflict and violence

in Afghanistan, Bangladesh and India, underlining the persistence of displacement challenges even as dynamics of violence shift.

Clashes at the Afghanistan-Pakistan border lead to evacuations

Conflict and violence triggered 548,000 displacements in South Asia in 2025, a nearly 49-fold increase compared with 2024 and the highest annual figure since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021. In a notable shift, international rather than internal conflict accounted for more displacements as tensions escalated in different locations, a trend echoed in other regions, including in East Asia (see overview, p. 61).

Pakistan recorded its highest conflict displacement figure in more than a decade. It was also the second consecutive year in which it recorded the highest figure in the region, illustrating growing tensions within the country and at its borders.


Conflict displacement in the region increased nearly 50-fold, reaching the highest figure since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021.

46 per cent of the movements, over 251,000, were recorded in Pakistan. Afghanistan accounted for around a third of the total as clashes between the two countries erupted. The remainder were recorded in India at or near its contested border with Pakistan.

New and long-running conflicts left around 5.7 million people living in internal displacement across South Asia as of the end of the year, primarily

Evacuations in the northern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa before Operation Sarbakaf, which targeted non-state armed groups (NSAGs), accounted for

Record number of IDPs as conflict expands across the region



152,000 movements as people sought shelter in sites coordinated by provincial authorities between July and September. The same authorities were also responding to flood displacement at the same time, highlighting how the impacts of conflict and disasters sometimes overlap.¹⁰⁴

Pakistan accounted for 46 per cent of the region's conflict displacements, at over 251,000, the highest in the region and the country's highest in more than a decade.

Border tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan increased since late 2024 and escalated into conflict in 2025. Clashes at the Torkham border point in early March led to 15,000 displacements in **Pakistan** and further airstrikes in early October triggered around 161,000 movements in **Afghanistan's** Kandahar province.¹⁰⁵

Renewed violence and displacement in Kashmir

Conflict between Pakistan and India erupted in late April after an armed attack in Indian-administered Kashmir. The Kashmir region has been disputed since 1947, but fighting with significant impact on civilians had been limited, especially since 2019, making the escalation in 2025 one of the most significant cross-border episodes in recent years.¹⁰⁶

Fighting along and beyond the Line of Control triggered around 125,000 displacements in **India** and approximately 8,000 in Pakistan, though limited reporting means the figures are conservative.¹⁰⁷ In India, people evacuated away from the frontline were urged not to rush to return for fear of unexploded ordnance and further shelling, leading civilians to take refuge in state-run shelters or host families.¹⁰⁸

Displacement also took place in several districts of **Pakistan**-administered Kashmir, but it was difficult to establish its scale given insufficient reporting.¹⁰⁹

Over 5.7 million people were internally displaced as a result of conflict and violence in South Asia at the end of the year, most for years or even decades. **Afghanistan** accounted for around three-quarters of the total. The vast majority were living in protracted displacement, but around 161,000 had fled the 2025 clashes with Pakistan. Economic hardship, entrenched vulnerabilities, insufficient infrastructure and premature returns have all hampered progress towards durable solutions.¹¹⁰

Meanwhile, almost 583,000 people were internally displaced for decades in **Bangladesh**. An additional 530,000 people were living in internal displacement in **India**, mostly due to the situation in Kashmir, as well as a result of communal violence in Manipur in 2023 (see spotlight, p. 41).

Three countries recording the highest internal displacements by conflict and violence

Pakistan
251,000

Afghanistan
168,000

India
128,000

Others

Spotlight – India

More than two years of displacement after violence in Manipur

Communal violence between Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities erupted in India's north-eastern state of Manipur in May 2023, triggering displacement within the state and into neighbouring states. Two years later, at least 78,000 people are still displaced within the state of Manipur amid continuing insecurity and restricted mobility and access to services.¹¹¹

Large-scale confrontations have decreased significantly, but conditions for voluntary, safe and dignified return are not guaranteed. Many families were still living in camps or with host communities as of 31 December 2025. Continued monitoring will be essential to understand return conditions and potential longer-term solutions.

Long-standing disputes over land rights, governance arrangements and socioeconomic inequalities contributed to the violence in 2023 across several districts, including Churachandpur, Imphal East, Imphal West, Bishnupur, Tengnoupal and Kangpokpi.¹¹²

IDMC initially recorded 66,000 internal displacements in Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland and Assam states, based on publicly available information from authorities, media and civil society organisations.¹¹³ It was the highest figure for displacement associated with conflict and violence in India since 2018.¹¹⁴ District administrators launched an online registration system for displaced people to improve the coordination of relief efforts and access to services. These official camp registries raised the estimate to almost 78,000 in Manipur state alone (see Behind the data).

The national government put in place a series of curfews, communication

shutdowns and security deployments to curb the violence and misinformation.¹¹⁵ Relief camps were established to assist those displaced and reduce the risk of secondary disaster displacement, which is particularly high during the monsoon season.¹¹⁶

As the situation evolved, Manipur became increasingly divided geographically, with most displaced families unable to return to previously mixed neighbourhoods and instead staying in areas dominated by their ethnic group. The state's central valley is largely Meitei, while the surrounding hills are Kuki-Zo. This de-facto separation has restricted mobility, access to services and short-term prospects for return.¹¹⁷

People living in hills have only limited access to the administrative and healthcare services available in the lowland capital of Imphal, often relying on long and unreliable routes that become more precarious during the monsoon season. Camp conditions vary and services are provisional, with limited gender-sensitive sanitation and healthcare.¹¹⁸

Many displaced households in both the valley and the hills rely heavily on food rations, stipends and community-based support, and livelihood opportunities are limited. The lack of clarity, predictability and transparency of cash transfers, which are sometimes sent to camp management rather than directly to households, has been an additional constraint.¹¹⁹

The presence of decades-old non-state armed groups continues to restrict access to farmland, markets and certain transit routes, contributing to insecurity and uncertainty for IDPs.¹²⁰

Despite these challenges, displaced communities have shown strong solidarity and resilience, setting up local committees to manage distributions and communal kitchens.¹²¹

Way forward

Around 52,000 IDPs were living in relief camps and nearly 26,000 with host families in Manipur state at the end of 2025.¹²²

The national government took direct administrative control of Manipur from the state authorities in early 2025.¹²³ It announced in September that it would start a phased reconstruction programme, including the rebuilding of homes for affected families.¹²⁴ Plans to provide permanent housing for those unable to return to their home villages have also been announced, but timelines are uncertain.¹²⁵

The situation in Manipur illustrates how displacement triggered by violence can quickly become prolonged. The violence has receded, but social and territorial divisions persist, movement is restricted and livelihoods have yet to recover. Concerns about relocation outside customary areas and its potential implications for land and administrative arrangements further complicate the prospects for durable solutions.¹²⁶

Better communication with displaced communities and transparent monitoring of their living conditions will be essential for lasting recovery. Sustained national and local engagement, and reliable data on returns, reconstruction and secondary displacement would all help to facilitate durable solutions.

Behind the data

Retrospective revision of estimates

Monitoring displacement in settings that are volatile or remote or where violence is active presents significant challenges. During the initial months of the violence in Manipur, access restrictions and frequent internet shutdowns limited the information available to government statements occasionally relayed by local and national media. The initial estimate of 66,000 displacements was based on triangulation of the most reliable and publicly available information from authorities, local media and civil society organizations.

As the situation stabilised, media attention waned, making it more difficult to paint an accurate picture of the people still displaced. Evidence that they have returned home, integrated locally or settled elsewhere and have overcome the vulnerabilities related to their displacement is rarely available, let alone systematic.

In the case of Manipur, district authorities established a registration process in relief camps, illustrating an effort by local government to monitor displacement. The process helped generate more systematic information on people living in camps and supported efforts to track needs and potential progress toward durable solutions. An IDMC mission in early October 2025 also allowed to verify the original figures, providing the basis to retrospectively adjust the earlier estimate upwards to 78,000.

This long-term follow up and persistent monitoring for the most accurate available data is essential to establish precise baselines, identify new trends and support efforts to achieve durable solutions in situations of conflict and violence.

The Americas



The Americas recorded more than **5.9 million** internal displacements in 2025, accounting for nearly 10 per cent of the global total. This was a significant drop from the record for 2024, the result of fewer disasters, but still the second-highest figure in a decade.

Disasters, including an exceptional Pacific tsunami alert, a high-intensity Caribbean hurricane and early-onset wildfires, triggered more than **4.3 million** movements, or over 73 per cent of the total. Pre-emptive evacuations accounted for at least 52 per cent of movements, underscoring the role of early warning systems and emergency preparedness in shaping displacement patterns.


Conflict and violence triggered almost **1.6 million movements** as non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and criminal groups forced growing numbers of people to flee in countries such as Haiti, Colombia and Ecuador.

Around **10.5 million** people were living in internal displacement across the region as of the end of the year, 13 per cent of the global total and a slight increase from 2024. Around 10.2 million had been displaced by conflict and violence, primarily in Colombia, and 360,000 by disasters, the majority in Jamaica.




A woman displaced by violence in Norte de Santander department, Colombia. Conflict and violence triggered almost 1.6 million displacements in the Americas in 2025, mostly concentrated in Haiti, Colombia and Ecuador. © Milena Ayala/NRC

Record number of IDPs amid ongoing conflict and violence



Total number of IDPs in the Americas in millions
*First year disaster data is available

Three-fold drop in number of disaster displacements after 2024 peak



Internal displacements in the Americas in millions

Disasters

Disasters triggered more than 4.3 million displacements across the Americas in 2025, the second highest annual figure in a decade. Unlike in previous years, however, the region's most populous countries, the US and Brazil, were not the most affected. Chile and Cuba recorded the highest figures, illustrating how disasters can affect anyone and anywhere.

Pre-emptive evacuations accounted for more than half of the region's movements. Chile recorded around 1.5 million displacements in response to a Pacific-wide tsunami alert in July (see spotlight, p. 51), and Cuba 735,000 ahead of hurricane Melissa in October. Displacement elsewhere was largely triggered by smaller-scale and more geographically dispersed hazards.

From a policy perspective, Colombia officially recognised people who flee natural hazards, including floods, landslides and volcanic eruptions, as "victims of the state". A new law grants them the same resources and legal

protection, including a registry and long-term support, as people displaced by conflict and violence. The law also focuses on prevention, climate adaptation and durable solutions, setting an example for the region and beyond.¹²⁷


Around 360,000 people in the region were living in displacement as a result of disasters at the end of the year, nearly 78 per cent of them in Jamaica.

Hurricane Melissa underscores the role of pre-emptive evacuations

Hurricane Melissa triggered more than a million displacements across eight Caribbean and Central American countries in late October. As the strongest cyclone of the year worldwide and the third most powerful on record in the area, it highlighted how pre-emptive evacuations and preparedness significantly shape displacement outcomes, particularly in island settings.¹²⁸

Cuba is highly exposed to hurricanes, but the event still led to the country's highest displacement figure since Irma in 2017. It recorded more than 70 per

Storm displacements decrease significantly



*Includes earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic activity

Small-scale storms and floods

cent of the region's 2025 hurricane displacements as 735,000 people were pre-emptively evacuated up to two days before Melissa's landfall as a category three storm. No loss of life was reported and long-term displacement was limited, despite extensive flooding and landslides, with nearly 2,700 people still displaced at the end of the year.¹²⁹

As the strongest cyclone of the year worldwide, Melissa highlighted how pre-emptive evacuations can significantly shape displacement outcomes, particularly in island settings.

In October 2024, Hurricane Oscar, a category one hurricane, struck the same eastern provinces of Granma and Santiago de Cuba and triggered only 144,000 pre-emptive evacuations, but left around 37,000 people displaced at the end of the year.¹³⁰ The scale of evacuations before Melissa reflected lessons learned and improved preparedness, including the launch of an anticipatory action framework for hurricanes earlier in 2025.¹³¹

Before hitting Cuba, Melissa made landfall in **Jamaica** as a category five hurricane, triggering approximately 279,000 displacements, the country's highest figure on record. The extent of deaths and destruction led the name Melissa to be retired from the list of hurricanes to avoid future usage and confusion, and with consideration of those affected.¹³² Preparedness measures were activated, but there were relatively few pre-emptive evacuations.¹³³ Satellite imagery showed high levels of housing and infrastructure damage, particularly in the parishes of Westmoreland and Saint Elizabeth. Around 279,000 people were still displaced as a result of hurricane Melissa as of the end of the year.¹³⁴

Storms and floods triggered nearly 1.2 million displacements in the Americas in 2025, with floods accounting for nearly 807,000 and storms 347,000. Unlike previous years' large-scale flood emergencies, the figures were primarily the result of numerous small and medium-scale events that affected a wide range of locations and communities. Improved data systems also enabled more systematic recording of smaller localised events.

The largest flood occurred in the **United States'** state of Washington, where an atmospheric river – a long, narrow and concentrated band of water vapour in the atmosphere – triggered around 100,000 displacements in early December.¹³⁵ The country recorded another 166,000 flood displacements during the year. No other single flood dominated the regional figures, underscoring how numerous low-intensity events can generate significant cumulative impacts.

Several countries illustrated this pattern. **Brazil** recorded around 400,000 storm displacements as a result of small-scale events across the country, compared with 770,000 flood displacements triggered by a single event in 2024. **Peru** recorded more than 166,000 movements linked to small-scale floods in various regions, the vast majority between February and April. This was similar to the figure for 2023, when a national state of emergency was declared after large-scale flooding in northern departments in March.¹³⁶

A small number of other countries with relatively low figures experienced record disaster displacements linked to single, highly localised events. A flood in Veracruz in early October accounted for most of **Mexico's** nearly 73,000 flood displacements, more than in the previous ten years combined.¹³⁷ A storm in Buenos Aires in mid-May triggered 70 per cent of **Argentina's** 32,000 disaster displacements, the highest figure in a decade.¹³⁸

Three countries recording the highest internal displacements by disaster



Others

Wildfires become a year-round displacement risk

Wildfires triggered nearly 456,000 displacements in the Americas in 2025, continuing an upward trend since 2022 with the second-highest annual figure in the last decade. Displacement was highly concentrated, both geographically and temporally, reflecting the growing intensity and changing frequency of wildfire risk, among other hazards.

The **United States** recorded 374,000 movements, 82 per cent of the regional total and 54 per cent of the global figure. Wildfires also accounted for over half of the country's disaster displacements in a year with exceptionally few hurricanes.

Wildfires triggered nearly 456,000 displacements in the Americas in 2025. Displacement was highly concentrated, reflecting the growing intensity of wildfire risk.

The vast majority were recorded in California, which has consistently been the state most affected in recent years and was the scene of the record 2020 wildfire season. Los Angeles county was the hardest hit after various fires broke out simultaneously, overwhelming response capacity.¹³⁹ The destruction of homes left more than 33,000 people still living in displacement at the end of the year amid a housing crisis.¹⁴⁰

More than 315,000 displacements occurred in January, compared to 266,000 in all of 2024, underscoring how wildfires have shifted from being a summer to a year-round displacement risk, and highlighting the need to adapt preparedness and response capacity as changing weather patterns drive more intense and unpredictable hazards (see spotlight, p. 69).¹⁴¹

Canada recorded 71,000 associated movements, the second-highest figure in the region. This was significantly fewer than in the record 2023 season, but still among the highest annual totals of the past decade, pointing to sustained wildfire risk.¹⁴²



Two people embrace as they inspect a family member's home destroyed in California, United States, in January 2025. The country accounted for over half of all wildfire displacements worldwide.
© Justin Sullivan/Getty Images

Conflict and violence

Violence against civilians rises again in Haiti

Conflict and violence triggered 1.6 million displacements in the Americas in 2025, mostly concentrated in Haiti, Colombia and Ecuador, which all reported their highest conflict displacement figures on record. This was an increase on the previous year as NSAGs and other criminal groups expanded their operations and attacked civilians. Displacements at a lesser scale were also recorded in El Salvador, Mexico, Honduras and Guatemala in part due to a lack of systematic data collection.


Displacement in **Haiti** increased for the fifth consecutive year, reaching nearly 977,000 displacements, another record figure and 62 per cent of the regional total. The country also recorded more than 80 per cent of displacements associated with criminal violence worldwide, illustrating its largely unique situation.

Haiti, Colombia and Ecuador all reported their highest conflict and violence displacement figures on record.

Nearly 10.2 million people in the region were living in displacement as a result of conflict and violence at the end of the year. Colombia accounted for 71 per cent of the total and Haiti 14 per cent. A national survey in Guatemala in 2023 revealed that nearly 573,000 people displaced during the 1975-1996 civil war or other incidents of violence since were still to achieve durable solutions to their displacement.¹⁴³

Most departments recorded more displacements in the first half of the year, with Sud and Ouest seeing the most significant decreases in the second half. The *Viv Ansanm* gang alliance's consolidation of control over Port-au-Prince meant displacement continued to spread beyond the capital, as it had done the previous year. In 2025, however, violence escalated most in Centre and Artibonite departments to

Record number of IDPs for the second consecutive year



the north of the capital rather than in its south.¹⁴⁴

More than a quarter of displacements were to Centre, including from within the department, where violence against civilians peaked between June and September. This also led neighbouring Artibonite to record an increase in arrivals. The border municipality of Belladère hosted large numbers of IDPs and Haitians deported from the Dominican Republic.¹⁴⁵

Another 20 per cent of displacements, more than 194,000, took place in or towards Ouest department, which includes Port-au-Prince. IDPs sheltered in highly concentrated and overcrowded sites in only 10 of the country's 140-plus municipalities, highlighting the lack of safe spaces. Some sites were closed during the year. Most people continued to stay with host families, putting further strain on already limited resources.¹⁴⁶

Around 1.4 million people were living in displacement as a result of violence at the end of 2025, of whom more than 80 per cent had been displaced repeatedly in the last two years.¹⁴⁷ Ouest was hosting most IDPs, at 402,000, while Sud and Sud-Est together hosted 356,000 IDPs, and Centre and Artibonite 313,000 IDPs.

Armed groups trigger increasing displacements

Colombia recorded more than 394,000 conflict displacements in 2025, a slight increase on the previous year as conflict and violence continued to expand beyond traditional hotspots along the Pacific coast and other eastern areas.¹⁴⁸

The Catatumbo region in Norte de Santander department near the border with Venezuela recorded more movements in January and February than in the whole of 2024, including the largest displacement event in the area in three decades. Many of those affected were farmers, indigenous people, refugees and migrants, all particularly vulnerable to the impacts of displacement. Despite

the ongoing threat of violence, some people returned for fear of losing their homes and land.¹⁴⁹

Displacement triggers have changed significantly in recent years, from fighting between NSAGs and the army to clashes involving NSAGs and criminal groups and targeted violence against civilians, including confinement, kidnapping and forced recruitment.¹⁵⁰

Displacement triggers in Colombia have shifted in recent years, from fighting between NSAGs and the army to clashes between NSAGs and targeted violence against civilians.

Around 7.2 million people were living in displacement as of the end of the year, the second-highest figure in the world and similar to 2024. The persistently high number of IDPs illustrates the long-term if shifting nature of conflict in the country, and the government's commitment to monitoring those displaced for years or even decades.

Conflict and violence associated with NSAGs in Colombia has also contributed to insecurity in neighbouring **Ecuador**. Violence there has escalated rapidly, prompting the president to declare a non-international armed conflict in January 2024.¹⁵¹ The systematic collection of displacement data also began that year, revealing almost 101,000 movements linked to conflict and violence. That figure rose to nearly 132,000 in 2025 as the country experienced its most violent year and had already become one of the countries recording the highest homicide rates in the Americas.¹⁵²

A household survey carried out by the Ombudsman's Office of Ecuador together with UNHCR in the provinces most affected by violence, such as Guayas, Manabí and Pichincha, suggests that around 316,000 people were living in displacement at the end of the year.¹⁵³

Three countries recording the highest internal displacements by conflict and violence

Haiti
977,000

Colombia
394,000

Ecuador
132,000

Others



Spotlight – Chile

Lessons from pre-emptive tsunami evacuations

An 8.8 magnitude earthquake shook the Kamchatka peninsula, on the eastern coast of Russia, on 29 July 2025. It was one of the strongest on record globally, and triggered Pacific-wide tsunami alerts.¹⁵⁴ Chile was tens of thousands of kilometres from the epicentre, but it activated emergency protocols that led to around 1.5 million pre-emptive evacuations along its extensive coastline.¹⁵⁵ The coordinated anticipatory movements reflected decades of investment in preparedness and disaster risk reduction.

The Pacific Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System (PTWS) quickly identified potential threats from the quake, alerting the Hydrographic and Oceanographic Service of the Navy and the National Service for Disaster Prevention and Response (SENAPRED), which issued evacuation alerts for residents of all coastal areas less than 30 metres above sea level. Schools in coastal municipalities between the regions of Arica and Los Lagos were closed on 30 July as a precaution. A number of hospitals, health centres and prisons were also evacuated.¹⁵⁶

The vast majority of evacuees sheltered with family or friends, but municipalities also opened hundreds of dedicated shelters for residents unable to return home overnight or find alternative accommodation.¹⁵⁷

The tsunami waves were not as high as had been anticipated and caused no major damage or casualties. The O'Higgins region recorded the highest at 2.5 metres. In the morning of 31 July, all alerts had been lifted and people were able to return home.¹⁵⁸

Lessons from decades of preparedness

Chile's effective response to the Kamchatka earthquake was the product of decades of lessons learned from major geophysical disasters. The catastrophic 1960 Valdivia earthquake and associated tsunami prompted widespread national reforms, from building codes and land-use planning to seismic monitoring and emergency communication.¹⁵⁹ It also shaped international cooperation, including the creation of the 46-country PTWS.¹⁶⁰

Subsequent events, however, including an 8.8 magnitude earthquake and associated tsunami that affected 80 per cent of Chile's population on 27 February 2010, exposed significant gaps. Inadequate risk assessment, insufficient technology, delayed evacuation warnings and uncertainty about safe returns were acknowledged and shaped further disaster management and institutional reforms.¹⁶¹

These changes translated into faster decision-making, more precise risk assessments and timely communication in response to the Kamchatka quake. Close monitoring of wave action allowed evacuation orders to be issued in phases three hours ahead of projected arrival times, giving ample opportunity for calm evacuations by region, preventing unnecessary displacements and avoiding a simultaneous nationwide process. Residents received mobile phone notifications from the national emergency alert system and were directly informed when they could return, reducing the duration of displacement.¹⁶²

Chile's investment in disaster preparedness was also evident in the uptake of the evacuation alerts. Regular drills, information campaigns and the integration of disaster risk education in schools have established a culture of anticipatory action and awareness of its benefits (see Behind the data).¹⁶³ Recent collaborations with the Ministry of Education have involved children and adolescents in designing preparedness materials, deepening community engagement and underlining the state's commitment to inclusive and participatory risk reduction for future generations.

Around 14 million people have participated in earthquake and tsunami drills since 2015.¹⁶⁴ These exercises normalise pre-emptive movement, reduce stress during evacuations and help households re-enact appropriate behaviour. Maps indicating evacuation routes, meeting points and safe zones for different hazard types are also publicly available online.¹⁶⁵

Households are encouraged to keep basic evacuation kits, including water, food, identification documents and essential medication, allowing them to leave quickly when the alarm is sounded. This relieves pressure on emergency services and enhances people's safety, independence and agency.¹⁶⁶

Chile's experience shows that when early warning systems, governance structures and community preparedness are strong, preventive temporary displacement can be an effective risk reduction measure that saves lives and minimises disruption.



Earthquake epicentre

Alert status

- Alert
- Precautionary
- No alert

1.5 million
pre-emptive evacuations nationwide

Sources: SENAPRED (31.07.25, 00:22), USGS, World Bank Official Boundaries, Natural Earth.



SANTIAGO

Behind the data

Measuring pre-emptive evacuations

Pre-emptive evacuations are considered a form of displacement because they involve people's involuntary movement from their homes. When people move before a disaster, guided by early warning systems, evacuation orders and risk information, they avoid exposure, prevent casualties and reduce the risk and impacts of long-term displacement. Such movements represent successful anticipatory action.

IDMC identified pre-emptive evacuations in 32 of the countries and territories it monitored in 2025. The actual number is likely to be higher for want of exhaustive data. National statistics tend only to capture the outcomes of disasters, such as damaged housing, people staying in shelters or productivity losses, without noting whether preventive mobility helped to reduce these impacts. The scale and value

of pre-emptive displacement is largely invisible in global datasets and policy discourse as a result.

IDMC addresses this gap by recording pre-emptive evacuations when they meet specific criteria. Movements must occur before a hazard's impact, and they must be identified as pre-emptive evacuations or linked to an official alert or evacuation order.

Improved reporting from national authorities on alerts issued, at-risk areas, estimates of populations affected and evacuation timings would help to differentiate protective movements from displacement triggered by damage and destruction, improving comparability and enabling better decision making. Strengthening this data stream is key to recognising the protective value of pre-emptive evacuation and supporting more effective anticipatory action worldwide.

Two residents of Valparaíso, Chile, head to a safe area during the tsunami alert, which triggered around 1.5 million pre-emptive evacuations along the coast. Disaster preparedness and early warning systems turned temporary displacement into an effective life-saving measure. © Marcelo Hernandez/Getty Images

Europe and Central Asia



Europe and Central Asia recorded **461,000 internal displacements** in 2025, nearly half the figure for the previous year, in part the result of fewer floods, storms and conflict movements. For the first year since the beginning of the war in Ukraine in 2022, there were more displacements associated with disasters than conflict and violence.

Disasters triggered **291,000 movements**, nearly two-thirds of the total, half of which were concentrated in June and August as wildfires forced people from their homes across Türkiye and Greece. An earthquake also led to 100,000 displacements in Istanbul in April.


Conflict and violence triggered almost **171,000 movements**, all linked to the war between Ukraine and Russia, slightly fewer than in 2024.

Over 5.9 million people were living in internal displacement across the region as of the end of 2025, seven per cent of the global total and a figure in line with 2024. More than 5.2 million or 88 per cent had been displaced by conflict and violence, while nearly 710,000 were displaced by disasters.




A resident amid smoke and flames in Izmir province, Türkiye. More than 50,000 people were evacuated, the largest single wildfire-related evacuation on record in Türkiye. © Lokman Ilhan/Anadolu via Getty Images

Protracted conflicts keep the number of IDPs stable



Total number of IDPs in Europe and Central Asia in millions
*First year disaster data is available

Number of displacements falls for the second consecutive year



Internal displacements in Europe and Central Asia in thousands
*in millions

Disasters

Intensifying wildfires near populated areas

Europe and Central Asia was the least affected region by disaster displacement globally, in part because its exposure to high-intensity hazards is relatively low and it has effective disaster risk management practices in place. As in other regions, a lack of systematic data collection also means figures may not reflect the true scale of the phenomenon.


Wildfires triggered around 170,000 displacements, or nearly 60 per cent of the regional total, while a single earthquake accounted for 34 per cent. Nearly 710,000 people were living in internal displacement as a result of disasters in the region at the end of 2025, the vast majority of whom, 650,000, had fled the February 2023 earthquakes in Türkiye. Around 3,700 people were also still displaced in Iceland since the 2023 eruption of the Grindavík volcano.

The region recorded its highest annual number of wildfire displacements in 2025, and more than double the number recorded in the previous year. This significant increase reflected a global trend in 2025 as large-scale fires also affected other parts of the world (see Americas regional overview p. 43 and Korea spotlight, p. 69).

Wildfires triggered nearly 60 per cent of disaster displacements in Europe and Central Asia, with 2025 recording the hazard's highest annual total.

Greece accounted for more than 79,000 movements, its second-highest figure on record. Most occurred in June and August, when extreme heat, drought conditions and high winds fuelled an

Record number of wildfire displacements



intense wildfire season.¹⁶⁷ The Attica region near Athens was the most affected with around 33,000 displacements. Recurrent wildfires in the area and the proximity of wildland to densely populated areas have increased displacement risk and contributed to longer-term environmental degradation, heightening exposure to other hazards, such as flash floods and landslides.¹⁶⁸

Fast-spreading wildfires in the western province of İzmir in late June led to the largest single wildfire-related evacuation on record in **Türkiye**. More than 50,000 people were evacuated, including 42,000 in Seferihisar district alone.¹⁶⁹ With its high forest cover, İzmir had already recorded wildfire displacements in 2024, but far fewer at 3,700.¹⁷⁰ Smaller-scale wildfire displacement also took place in Marmara region, which recorded nearly 6,000 movements in late July and early August.¹⁷¹ The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) coordinated large-scale emergency response operations.¹⁷²

Further east in the Mediterranean, **Cyprus** saw 3,700 wildfire displacements, a record high for a second year in a row.

Spain recorded nearly 30,000 wildfire displacements, also its second-highest figure on record and a near six fold increase compared with 2024. As in previous years, most movements occurred in August. A single wildfire in Castilla y Leon region accounted for more than 19,000, prompting emergency support measures, including financial assistance for affected households.¹⁷³

Earthquake shakes Türkiye two years after catastrophe

A 6.2 magnitude earthquake struck Istanbul on 23 April, triggering 100,000 movements in Türkiye's largest city, Istanbul, which is home to around 16 million people. Many residents made for open spaces such as parks as soon as the shaking was felt, highlighting good

public awareness of the risks of building collapse and aftershocks.¹⁷⁴

People were advised not to re-enter buildings until safety inspections had been completed, leaving around 51,000 sheltering in mosques and 50,000 in schools and public facilities. Authorities and civil society organisations coordinated emergency assistance, including food, water and information on return conditions.¹⁷⁵ No casualties were reported and no inhabited buildings were destroyed, allowing all those displaced to return relatively quickly.¹⁷⁶

High public awareness of earthquake risk prompted protective action, as residents in Istanbul sought open spaces when shaking began.

Istanbul is highly exposed and vulnerable to earthquake risk given its proximity to major fault lines and decades of rapid and sometimes unregulated urban expansion. Public awareness and concern about building safety nationwide was also heightened by the devastating earthquakes that struck southern Türkiye in February 2023.¹⁷⁷ As of the end of 2025, 650,000 people were still living in temporary housing in government-built containers after the 2023 earthquakes, highlighting the long-term impacts of geophysical hazards. This is a slight increase on the figure for 2024 as a result of improved monitoring and increased housing support, which shed light on people who had previously been unaccounted for.¹⁷⁸

On the opposite side of the continent, one of the most powerful earthquakes ever recorded struck Russia's eastern peninsula in July, triggering 2,700 displacements in the sparsely populated area and tsunami alerts that led to 1.5 million pre-emptive evacuations on the other side of the Pacific Ocean in Chile (see spotlight, p. 51).

Three countries recording the highest internal displacements by disaster

Türkiye
156,000

Greece
79,000

Spain
33,000

Others

Conflict and violence

Conflict and violence triggered 171,000 displacements in Europe and Central Asia in 2025, 99 per cent of which were the result of the war between Ukraine and Russia. It was the lowest annual figure since the start of the conflict in 2022, reflecting relatively static frontlines and a decline in large-scale evacuations rather than an improvement in the overall situation.

More than 5.2 million people were living in internal displacement across the region as of the end of 2025, a figure broadly unchanged from the previous year. Ukraine accounted for 3.7 million as active conflict continued to hamper returns. Even conflicts that took place decades ago still left 1.5 million displaced, illustrating challenges to advancing durable solutions as well as the relevance of long-term monitoring (see Behind the data, p. 32 and p. 42).


Fewer conflict displacements

Ukraine again recorded the region's largest number of conflict displacements at around 168,000, a three-fold decrease from 2024. Around 63 per cent took place in May and June, reflecting periods of more intense hostilities and displacement.

Conflict and violence triggered 171,000 internal displacements in Europe and Central Asia, the lowest annual total since the start of the war between Ukraine and Russia.

The eastern oblasts of Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk accounted for the highest figures, as they had done in 2024. Nearly 103,000 movements were recorded in Donetsk, almost two-thirds of the national total, while Dnipropetrovsk recorded around 35,000.

Protracted displacement remains persistently high



More than 3.7 million people were living in displacement in Ukraine as of the end of 2025, most of them in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv and Kyiv oblasts, where displacement patterns have largely stabilised since 2023.

Russia recorded 2,700 movements in 2025, its lowest figure since the beginning of the war. Nearly half took place in Kursk oblast and were linked with Ukrainian military operations in March and April.

Fighting in Ukraine near the border with **Romania** in November led to nearly 250 pre-emptive evacuations in the latter, the first on record for the country. People were able to return the next day.¹⁷⁹

Beyond Ukraine, around 1.5 million people were living in displacement in the region as a result of conflicts that took place decades ago. Around 657,000 had not yet returned to their place of origin or achieved durable solutions to their displacement in **Azerbaijan**, while **Georgia** and **Cyprus** were still home to around 301,000 and 247,000 IDPs, respectively.

Three countries recording the highest internal displacements by conflict and violence

Ukraine
168,000

Russia
2,700
Romania
250



Spotlight – Switzerland

Glacier collapse brings lessons for climate preparedness

The collapse of parts of the Small Nesthorn mountain and the Birch glacier destroyed the Alpine village of Blatten in Valais canton on 28 May 2025. The pre-emptive evacuation of the village's 300 inhabitants as well as 16 people in the neighbouring Klippel village shows the value of early warning systems in preventing loss of life and illustrates how preparedness can mitigate even unprecedented disasters. It also underscores how cascading hazards increasingly trigger displacement in remote mountain areas, including in resilient high-income countries.¹⁸⁰

Switzerland's monitoring of the Birch glacier since the 1990s allowed the authorities to track its evolution in extensive detail.¹⁸¹ Unlike most glaciers, which are receding as temperatures increase, Birch had advanced downhill and sections had thickened over the past six years under the weight of rockfalls.¹⁸² As the country is warming roughly twice as fast as the global average, the permafrost in the slopes surrounding the glacier, which had helped to hold rocks together at high altitudes, progressively weakened, increasing rockfall and setting the stage for the sudden detachment.¹⁸³

The monitoring systems that predicted Birch's collapse benefited from years of international knowledge-sharing and scientific innovation.¹⁸⁴ The glacier's unusual development had been under observation for some time, and early warning systems detected signs of instability in mid-May. This prompted authorities to evacuate the village and its livestock to the neighbouring hamlet ten days before the collapse. When the glacier finally gave way, it

caused a devastating landslide that obstructed a nearby river, creating a temporary dam that flooded the remaining parts of the village.¹⁸⁵

This illustrates how cascading hazards can unfold rapidly in mountain areas, where slow-onset environmental change has the potential to trigger sudden-onset disasters (see Behind the data).¹⁸⁶ Even in a well-prepared country such as Switzerland, such events can severely disrupt people's lives and have long-term economic implications. Nearly all homes, public infrastructure, agricultural land and touristic hotels were destroyed.¹⁸⁷

The event also demonstrates how combining advanced technology and local knowledge can improve anticipatory action and effective responses. Alpine communities have a long-standing awareness of the perils associated with their surroundings, which fosters vigilance and responsiveness.¹⁸⁸ Trained natural-hazard observers, or Naturgefahren-Beobachter, alerted authorities quickly when new cracks appeared on the glacier, leading to increased monitoring with cameras and other sensors. High levels of trust in local authorities and a clear evacuation plan also led to a smooth pre-emptive relocation to the nearby village of Wiler.¹⁸⁹

Reconstruction

The disaster fuelled broader global debates about habitability and how to manage human mobility in a changing climate: whether to invest in returning displaced people to high-risk areas or plan their permanent relocation elsewhere.¹⁹⁰

A temporary hotel opened in nearby Lauchernalp at the end of the year to provide short-term accommodation to displaced residents and to allow for the winter season tourism industry to survive.¹⁹¹ Some returns are projected in 2026, but Blatten's full reconstruction is expected to last until 2029, meaning years of displacement.¹⁹² A natural hazard risk map was redrawn in November, identifying around 30 per cent of the village as constructible land.¹⁹³

Funding for the undertaking will come in large part from insurance mechanisms that enable displaced people to return, rebuild and recover their livelihoods, along with federal and cantonal budgets and charitable donations.¹⁹⁴ Switzerland's natural-hazard insurance, which covers property loss from disasters, operates on a unique principle of double solidarity. All policyholders pay a fixed contribution, while insurers pool funds to cover major disasters. This keeps premiums affordable even for people in high-risk areas and encourages insurers to invest in disaster risk reduction and rapid recovery.¹⁹⁵

Even when it is temporary and well-managed, displacement must be recognised as a key dimension within the mountain-related indicators included in the Global Goal on Adaptation framework at COP30.¹⁹⁶ For policymakers, this means ensuring that at-risk communities can safely evacuate from remote areas, recover their livelihoods and freely choose to return or relocate with prospects of sustainable livelihoods.¹⁹⁷

Behind the data

From slow to sudden-onset disasters

The Blatten event illustrates how incremental environmental change can suddenly culminate in a sudden-onset disaster that devastates infrastructure and displaces communities. National disaster management systems tend to treat slow-onset processes as developmental or secondary issues. Because they evolve gradually and are difficult to monitor, they are often under-reported, resulting in significant data gaps that limit our understanding of how climate change indirectly leads to displacement.¹⁹⁸

Experience monitoring drought displacement offers valuable insights into the benefits of integrating environmental gauges with contextual and mobility data. Indicators associated with ecosystem degradation, such as agricultural loss or water scarcity, can complement longitudinal displacement

data and qualitative community insights to support comprehensive responses and durable solutions.¹⁹⁹

Applying similar methods in mountain regions, linking glacier, glacial lake, permafrost and slope monitoring with information on livelihoods and recovery, would strengthen preparedness and long-term resilience.²⁰⁰

Technology also has an important role to play. Combining risk modelling with local monitoring could produce robust forecasts that inform preventive measures.²⁰¹ In large and remote mountain ranges such as the Andes and the Himalayas, integrating satellite remote sensing, community reporting and pre-defined alert thresholds would help to identify risks to populated areas early, enable protective measures such as pre-emptive evacuation and strengthen climate resilience.²⁰²

Homes submerged after the landslide in Blatten, Switzerland, in May. The collapse of the Birch glacier demonstrates how coordinated monitoring, emergency planning and financing for reconstruction can reduce the human and economic toll of disaster displacement. © Sean Gallup/Getty Images

East Asia and the Pacific



East Asia and the Pacific recorded **19.6 million** internal displacements in 2025 as a result of a combination of storms, floods and conflict. Conflict and disasters both led to their highest regional figures since 2010.

Disasters triggered 89 per cent of the total at **17.5 million**, nearly 57 per cent of which were concentrated in the last quarter of the year as the monsoon season picked up. Typhoons triggered nearly 14.8 million movements, the highest figure in a decade, a reflection of intensifying weather-related hazards.


Conflict and violence triggered more than **2.1 million** displacements. The number of such movements decreased significantly in Myanmar, but fighting between Thailand and Cambodia reignited along their border, leading to both countries' highest ever recorded conflict displacement figures.

Nearly **5.9 million** people were living in internal displacement across the region as of the end of the year, seven per cent of the global total, a 12 per cent increase compared with 2024 which was already the region's highest on record. Less than a third had fled disasters, mostly in Indonesia and the Philippines, while 790,000 had been displaced by conflict and violence in Thailand and Cambodia.




A girl stands on the grounds of a displacement site hosting families affected by the March earthquake in Myanmar, which triggered around 327,000 displacements. The disaster occurred against the back-drop of conflict, illustrating the frequent overlap between conflict and disasters and IDPs' vulnerability to secondary displacement. © UNOCHA/Pierre Peron

Number of IDPs increases for the third consecutive year



Total number of IDPs in East Asia and the Pacific in millions
*First year disaster data is available

Record numbers of conflict and disaster displacements



Internal displacements in East Asia and the Pacific in millions

Disasters

East Asia and the Pacific recorded the largest share of internal displacements associated with disasters worldwide in 2025, accounting for around 59 per cent of the global total with more than 17.5 million movements. This reflects the region's high exposure to disasters, in part the result of dense populations living in hazard-prone areas. Evacuation protocols and other anticipatory actions also contribute to the high figures as people are temporarily displaced before or during disasters as a life-saving measure. An intensifying new norm of heavy flooding during the monsoon season also meant that nearly half of the year's disaster displacements took place in November alone.²⁰³

The Philippines accounted for more than 60 per cent of the movements and China 20 per cent, continuing a well-established trend. Storms, including typhoons, triggered 84 per cent of the region's disaster displacements at around 14.8 million, and floods 1.7 million. Geophysical hazards, including earthquakes and tsunamis, led to 707,000 movements. Wildfires trig-

gered around 45,000 displacements, but unlike in previous years, Korea and Japan reported the highest figures (see spotlight, p. 69).

Nearly 1.3 million people were living in displacement across the region as a result of the long-term impacts of disasters at the end of the year.


End-of-year storms trigger half of all disaster displacements

November alone accounted for 58 per cent of the region's storm displacements as the monsoon season kicked in and wreaked havoc in south-east Asia (see also South Asia regional overview, p. 33).

Almost 60 per cent of storm displacements were recorded in November, highlighting the importance of seasonal preparedness.

The Philippines accounted for nearly 70 per cent of the total or 10.2 million. The country is regularly exposed to such hazards, but this was still its high-

Storms trigger most displacements in a decade



est annual figure on record. China registered more than 2.7 million movements, representing nearly a fifth of the regional total.²⁰⁴ Indonesia, the world's fourth most populous country, recorded nearly 1.1 million displacements, its highest disaster displacement figure on record by far.

The highly concentrated and seasonal nature of typhoons allows authorities to improve their preparedness to efficiently support displaced communities when disasters strike, for example, by carrying out large-scale evacuations. Tropical cyclone Kalmaegi was the largest event of the year, triggering more than 3.6 million movements in early November. Almost 3.2 million displacements were registered in the **Philippines**, accounting for nearly 30 per cent of its disaster displacements. Typhoon Fung-wong struck the country just a few days later, triggering another 3.6 million movements, with the Bicol region worst affected.²⁰⁵

Kalmaegi also hit **Viet Nam** particularly hard, especially Gia Lai province, where it triggered 447,000 displacements. This was a significant figure, given the country's relatively small population, and represented more than half of the disaster displacements it recorded in 2025. Other disasters led to another 206,000 movements in the following weeks.²⁰⁶

Tropical cyclone Mitag triggered nearly three million displacements in mid-September. Guangdong province in **China** and Bicol region in the **Philippines** each recorded around a million.²⁰⁷ Tropical cyclone Wipha had already affected Guangdong in mid-July, when the province accounted for the largest share of the more than 2.1 million movements the storm triggered, illustrating how the same communities are often affected by successive storms within short periods.²⁰⁸

Tropical cyclone Senyar at the end of November coincided with the north-east monsoon and devastated parts of North and West Sumatra and Aceh provinces in **Indonesia**. It triggered nearly 1.1 million displacements in the

country, more than three-quarters of its record-breaking total. Early assessments suggest that human-induced climate change and widespread deforestation on Sumatra island contributed to the extent of the floods and landslides. The disaster left nearly 400,000 people living in displacement as of the end of the year, the highest figure in the region.²⁰⁹

Fewer flood displacements during monsoon

East Asia and the Pacific recorded around 1.7 million flood displacements in 2025, fewer than half the 2024 figure and the lowest since 2018. This significant decrease followed a global trend of fewer large-scale floods compared with the previous year. China and the Philippines again recorded the highest number of movements, together accounting for more than half of the regional total.

Flood displacements declined significantly compared to the previous year, mirroring the global trend.

China recorded nearly 600,000 displacements, a three-fold decrease from 2024. Almost all occurred during the monsoon season between June and August, mostly in Hunan province and near Beijing. Other smaller-scale flood displacements took place in locations across the country, highlighting the widespread exposure of the population to flooding and the cumulative significance of such events at the national level.

Major floods in the **Philippines** triggered nearly 110,000 movements in January and February, and recurrent smaller-scale events across the country during the rest of the year took the total to 396,000, around a third of the figure recorded in 2024.

Three countries recording the highest internal displacements by disaster

Philippines
10.7m

China
3.5m

Indonesia
1.5m

Others

Flood displacements in other countries were triggered primarily by single large events. **Indonesia** recorded more than 185,000 movements in Maros, South Sulawesi, in mid-February. The regency had already experienced heavy flooding in December 2024, decreasing soil absorption capacity and increasing the risk of flash floods and landslides.²¹⁰ **Thailand** similarly recorded virtually all of its nearly 230,000 disaster movements during a single flood event in mid-November, which affected 12 southern provinces and led to its highest displacement figure in over a decade, overlapping with an escalating border conflict.²¹¹

Powerful earthquakes

Although less frequent than weather-related disasters, high-intensity geophysical hazards can have sudden and devastating impacts on vulnerable communities. **Myanmar**, which has endured conflict for the last four years and was affected by tropical cyclone Yagi in 2024, was struck by its most powerful earthquake in more than a century on 28 March. The shallow 7.7 magnitude quake, with its epicentre at the Sagaing-Mandalay border region, triggered around 327,000 displacements in the country.²¹²

Nearly 12,000 homes and buildings were destroyed, requiring extensive relief and reconstruction efforts and prolonging displacement. Around 280,000 people were still displaced as a result of the earthquake at the end of the year, 264,000 living with relatives and 15,000 in temporary evacuation centres.²¹³

The disaster occurred against the backdrop of conflict, illustrating the frequent overlap between conflict and disasters and IDPs' vulnerability to secondary displacement. Around 1.6 million people were living in displacement as a result of conflict in the hardest-hit regions of

Mandalay, Sagaing and Shan States at the time of the earthquake.²¹⁴ Ceasefires were agreed during the emergency response, but access constraints and insecurity at times hampered effective and timely recovery efforts.²¹⁵

One of the most powerful earthquakes ever recorded in the world struck Russia's eastern province of Kamchatka at the end of July. Few displacements were recorded in the sparsely populated peninsula, but the quake triggered Pacific-wide tsunami warnings and led to 1.5 million pre-emptive evacuations in Chile and over 79,000 in **Japan** (see Chile spotlight, p. 51).



A girl stands in floodwaters in Hanoi, Viet Nam, in October. Disasters triggered 89 per cent of the region's internal displacements, at 17.5 million, the highest regional total in over a decade.
© UNICEF/UNI876271/Do Khuong Duy

Conflict and violence

East Asia and the Pacific recorded more than 2.1 million displacements associated with conflict and violence in 2025, the highest figure on record after four years of rapidly escalating violence. The type and geography of the phenomenon, however, shifted significantly.

The number of displacements triggered by Myanmar's internal conflict fell by more than half compared with 2024, but a resurgence of fighting between Thailand and Cambodia after more than a decade of relative calm fuelled a global rise in displacement linked to international armed conflict.

Nearly 4.6 million people were living in displacement as result of conflict and violence across the region at the end of the year, a 21 per cent increase compared with 2024. Myanmar accounted for nearly 80 per cent of the total, but the conflict between Thailand and Cambodia also left nearly 790,000 people displaced.


Conflict in south-east Asia shifts location

Clashes erupted along the border between Thailand and Cambodia in late May, escalated in late July and resumed in December after a four-month ceasefire.²¹⁶ The conflict triggered nearly 1.5 million movements on both sides of the border, two-thirds of them in December, and led to the highest number of associated casualties since 2011.²¹⁷

After four years of escalating conflict and violence, the region recorded over 2.1 million conflict displacements, its highest on record.

It was the first time IDMC recorded conflict displacement in **Cambodia** with 821,000 movements, contributing to a record 13 countries recording displacement associated with international armed conflict worldwide. Around 172,000 took place in the summer and at least another 649,000 when clashes reignited in December. Siem Reap province recorded the highest number in the first phase of the conflict, but by the end

Number of IDPs continues to break records as conflict expands across the region



of the year, 17 of the country's 25 provinces had recorded displacement as exposure to the conflict spread.²¹⁸

Thailand recorded more than 633,000 movements across eight provinces. Around 196,000 were recorded during the first round of fighting, mostly in Si Sa Ket and Surin provinces. This was already by far the largest conflict displacement event ever recorded in the country, but in December another 437,000 movements were reported. No further geographical disaggregation was available. Most of those displaced were from rural areas near the border who fled to government-organised evacuation shelters, disrupting livelihoods and halting cross-border trade.²¹⁹

Myanmar recorded nearly 573,000 conflict displacements in 2025, a sharp drop from the more than 1.2 million recorded in both previous years and closer to the levels observed in 2021 when the conflict erupted. The country had recorded the majority of the region's conflict displacements in recent years, but it accounted for slightly more than a quarter in 2025.

Nearly 4.6 million people were living in internal displacement due to conflict and violence, an increase of 21 per cent compared with 2024.

Displacement started to decline from October 2024 onwards, but unlike previous years the southernmost region of Tanintharyi recorded the highest number of movements at nearly 79,000. Sagaing, Rakhine and Kachin States remained displacement hotspots with 78,000, 70,000 and 68,000 respectively, all significant decreases compared with 2024.

More than 3.6 million people were living in displacement as result of conflict and violence across the country at the end of the year, slightly more than 2024 and another record high, underscoring how reductions in displacement do not necessarily translate into durable solutions.

Three countries recording the highest internal displacements by conflict and violence

Cambodia
821,000

Thailand
633,000

Myanmar
573,000

Others

Spotlight – Korea

2025 wildfire displacements reflect a growing global phenomenon

The Republic of Korea experienced its deadliest wildfires on record between 21 and 28 March 2025. Wildfires triggered nearly 40,000 movements, the highest annual figure for such displacement recorded for the country.²²⁰ The disaster also reflected a global trend of increasing wildfire displacements, which reached their highest level since 2020 at over 694,000. Wildfires' growing scale and impacts underscore that weather-related hazards now exceed previously anticipated thresholds and overwhelm the response capacities of even technologically advanced states.²²¹

North Gyeongsang-do (province) accounted for 80 per cent of the displacements, many of them taking place in Cheongsong-gun, Uiseong-gun, Yeongdeok-gun and Yeongyang-gun (counties) and Andong-si (city).²²² The province had already been affected by severe fires in March 2022, but in 2025 a combination of extreme dryness and drought from late 2024, temperatures up to 10C above the seasonal norm and high wind speeds spread the fires out of control.²²³

They rapidly burnt through over 104,000 hectares and overwhelmed local first responders.²²⁴ Authorities issued large-scale evacuation orders, and thousands of people moved into emergency shelters. Andong city was put under full evacuation order for the first time, underscoring the scale of the disaster.²²⁵ The government issued a nationwide alert within days and designated various provinces special disaster zones. This unlocked emergency funding and relief mechanisms, enabling the mobilisation of firefighters, the armed forces and other emergency responders.²²⁶

Temporary shelters were established in schools, community centres and municipal facilities, and security measures were taken to protect empty properties from looting.²²⁷ The Ministry of Health and Welfare deployed mobile medical and psychosocial teams and provided financial support to relieve pressure on those displaced.²²⁸ Civil society organisations, local community networks and volunteers also assisted in providing food, blankets and other relief supplies.²²⁹

Impacts

Older residents bore the brunt of the disaster. Nearly half of Uiseong county's population is over 65, one of the oldest averages in the country.²³⁰ Those without access to vehicles or with mobility challenges required assistance to evacuate, adding to the pressure on responders. Disrupted access to healthcare and essential medication required special attention in emergency shelters and aggravated the impacts of long-term displacement for elderly evacuees.²³¹

The fires claimed 31 lives, destroyed thousands of homes and damaged cultural sites dating back centuries such as the Gounsa temple.²³² As of the end of April, nearly 3,600 people were still displaced.²³³ The government's official damage and recovery estimated costs run to \$1.35 billion, but the figures do not include the hidden costs of displacement (see Behind the data).²³⁴

Disasters not only disrupt people's ability to work and earn an income during their evacuation. If recovery stretches over months as result of pervasive health conditions or homes being destroyed, the losses rise exponentially.²³⁵

Lessons Learned

These economic and social costs justify the Republic of Korea's significant investments in fire prevention, inter-agency coordination and public awareness in recent decades. The country is recognised for its sophisticated forest and weather monitoring systems and serves as a model for wildfire management internationally.²³⁶

The events of 2025, however, show that readiness must keep pace with evolving hazard risk. Despite precise forecasts, reports suggest evacuation alerts did not give enough notice or were inconsistent, in part the result of rapidly evolving wind conditions.²³⁷ Protocols and responsive messaging also need to be clearly understood to ensure that early detection leads to effective evacuation. Dedicated transport and adaptive measures are also essential for vulnerable people, including those in remote rural areas and nursing homes and those with reduced mobility.²³⁸

The disaster also exposed a need to enhance the Republic of Korea's firefighting capacity. Experts and government officials have supported the increased professionalisation of the fire fighting forces and investments in specialised equipment given climate projections indicate longer and more severe fire seasons.²³⁹

The disaster highlighted the need to integrate wildfire displacement into climate adaptation plans, strengthen evacuation protocols and enable rapid recovery to reduce human impacts and the costs of prolonged displacement.



31,000
displacements

104,000
hectares burnt

\$1.35 billion in
damage and recovery

\$19 million in lost
income from displacement

Behind the data

Estimating the hidden economic costs of displacement

Traditional post-disaster assessments focus primarily on loss and damage, including to property and infrastructure. Those conducted in Korea after the March 2025 wildfires put such losses at \$1.35 billion, but the figure omits the economic impact of displacement - the productivity losses experienced by people forced to flee their homes.

To capture these hidden costs, an approach inspired by the Disability-Adjusted Life Year (DALY) concept in public health can be used to estimate lost productive days among the people displaced by the wildfires. Based on government data on the reported duration of stays in evacuation centres

and with host families, the average displacement duration was estimated at five days. When applied to national income levels and the working-age population, this translates into approximately \$19 million in lost output.

These calculations rest on conservative assumptions and are intended to illustrate the potential scale of hidden economic losses rather than provide precise valuations. They, nonetheless, highlight how traditional disaster cost estimates underrepresent the human and economic consequences of displacement. Integrating such metrics into resilience and recovery planning would provide a fuller picture of disaster impacts and support investment in anticipatory action and social protection.

A cracked temple bell from the destroyed Gounsa Temple, North Gyeongsang-do, Korea. The historic wildfires incurred high economic and non-economic costs, including the country's highest internal displacement figure, underscoring the need to adapt disaster risk reduction to evolving hazard risk. © Yasuyoshi Chiba/AFP via Getty Images

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Summary of key figures

Country	Total number of IDPs at the end of 2025 (conflict and violence)	Total number of IDPs at the end of 2025 (disasters)	Internal displacements during 2025 (conflict and violence)	Internal displacements during 2025 (disasters)
Abyei Area	58,000	16,000	2,500	
Afghanistan	4,355,000	2,592,000	168,000	253,000
Albania		150		2,900
Algeria		10		3,100
Angola		27,000		44,000
Argentina		820		32,000
Australia		1,700		9,900
Austria				120
Azerbaijan	657,000			160
Bahamas				15,000
Bangladesh	583,000	4,956,000	220	105,000
Belize				160
Benin	26,000	1,100	4,700	800
Bermuda				100
Bhutan				140
Bolivia		9,300		13,000
Bosnia and Herzegovina	95,000			170
Botswana		7		5,600
Brazil	19,000			399,000
Bulgaria		46		46
Burkina Faso	2,063,000	210	316,000	210
Burundi	6,800	82,000	1,000	19,000
Cabo Verde				1,500
Cambodia	518,000	79	821,000	12,000
Cameroon	954,000	50,000	63,000	11,000
Canada		130		72,000
Central African Republic	427,000		148,000	17,000
Chad	593,000	48,000	36,000	89,000
Chile		180		1,502,000
China		177,000		3,502,000
Colombia	7,211,000		394,000	88,000
Congo		8		23,000
Costa Rica				1,500
Côte d'Ivoire			300	
Croatia				27
Cuba		2,700		753,000
Cyprus	247,000	580		3,700
Dem. Rep. Congo	4,276,000	630,000	9,748,000	313,000
Dominican Republic		54		31,000
Ecuador	316,000		132,000	9,600
Egypt				2
El Salvador	61,000		61,000	5,500
Equatorial Guinea				200
Eswatini		8		130

As part of a methodological revision, some figures published may differ from previous publications due to retroactive changes or the inclusion of previously unavailable data. For more detailed explanations about the sources, methodology and caveats regarding country-specific figures, please refer to the Figure Analysis in the Country Profiles available in IDMC's website.

Blank cells mean no data was available on those metrics.

Due to rounding, some totals may not correspond with the sum of the separate figures.

Country	Total number of IDPs at the end of 2025 (conflict and violence)	Total number of IDPs at the end of 2025 (disasters)	Internal displacements during 2025 (conflict and violence)	Internal displacements during 2025 (disasters)
Ethiopia	2,378,000	757,000	353,000	244,000
Fiji				1,500
France		100		4,500
French Guiana				88
French Polynesia				42
French Southern Territories				31
Gabon		1,500		1,500
Gambia		250		250
Georgia	301,000	53,000		290
Germany				270
Ghana	3,900		7,400	6,500
Greece		17		79,000
Guatemala	573,000		950	95,000
Guinea		130		640
Guinea-Bissau		700		3,000
Guyana		21		21
Haiti	1,431,000	17,000	977,000	9,500
Honduras	101,000		8,900	2,700
Hong Kong, China				1,400
Iceland		3,700		100
India	530,000	130,000	128,000	672,000
Indonesia	36,000	406,000	15,000	1,450,000
Iran			10,000,000	4,500
Iraq	997,000	186,000	32,000	16,000
Ireland				8
Israel	31,000		9,300	7,000
Italy		33		1,700
Jamaica		279,000		279,000
Japan		44,000		91,000
Kazakhstan				640
Kenya	10,000	3,800	11,000	40,000
Korea				62,000
Kosovo	16,000			12
Kyrgyzstan				790
Lebanon	64,000		41,000	
Libya	85,000	21,000	1,100	
Luxembourg				3
Macao, China				3,400
Madagascar		70,000		177,000
Malawi		24,000		46,000
Malaysia		610		148,000
Maldives				320
Mali	409,000	5,900	95,000	5,900
Mauritania				5,700

Country	Total number of IDPs at the end of 2025 (conflict and violence)	Total number of IDPs at the end of 2025 (disasters)	Internal displacements during 2025 (conflict and violence)	Internal displacements during 2025 (disasters)
Mauritius				280
Mayotte				20,000
Mexico	390,000		10,000	93,000
Mongolia		850		920
Morocco				39
Mozambique	465,000	144,000	339,000	669,000
Myanmar	3,639,000	281,000	573,000	406,000
Namibia		1,300		3,200
Nepal		2,100		2,100
Netherlands				4
New Zealand		19		530
Nicaragua				580
Niger	392,000	25,000	166,000	1,900
Nigeria	3,496,000	170,000	354,000	153,000
North Macedonia				36
Norway				64
Pakistan	269,000	403,000	251,000	3,045,000
Palestine	2,035,000		2,756,000	
Panama				440
Papua New Guinea	70,000	12	5,200	25
Paraguay				510
Peru	82,000	5,900		179,000
Philippines	28,000	367,000	71,000	10,743,000
Poland				20
Portugal		11		670
Réunion		13		1,000
Romania		100	250	1,300
Russia	580	26	2,700	3,600
Rwanda		81		3,400
Senegal				1,500
Serbia	194,000			
Sierra Leone		4,500		6,000
Slovenia				2
Somalia	3,347,000		214,000	335,000
South Africa		28,000		45,000
South Sudan	945,000	630,000	864,000	489,000
Spain		30		33,000
Sri Lanka	4,800	178,000		564,000
Sudan	9,117,000		1,733,000	30,000
Svalbard and Jan Mayen Islands				16
Switzerland		320		360
Syria	5,964,000		531,000	
Taiwan, China		1,700		39,000

Country	Total number of IDPs at the end of 2025 (conflict and violence)	Total number of IDPs at the end of 2025 (disasters)	Internal displacements during 2025 (conflict and violence)	Internal displacements during 2025 (disasters)
Tajikistan		560		560
Tanzania		4,500		9,200
Thailand	273,000		633,000	229,000
Timor-Leste				350
Tonga				11
Türkiye		651,000		156,000
Uganda	2,000	20,000	2,000	29,000
Ukraine	3,712,000		168,000	60
United Kingdom				910
United States		44,000		732,000
Uruguay				1,900
Venezuela		550		6,000
Viet Nam		15,000		832,000
Yemen	4,796,000		57,000	264,000
Zambia		2,300		3,000
Zimbabwe		2,200		2,200

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